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Note 
ASHCROFT v. IQBAL: HOW THE SUPREME COURT REWROTE 
RULE 8 TO IMMUNIZE HIGH-LEVEL EXECUTIVE 
OFFICIALS FROM POST-9/11 LIABILITY (A PLAUSIBLE 
INTERPRETATION) 
CARA SHEPLEY* 
“Few issues in civil procedure jurisprudence are more significant 
than pleading standards, which are the key that opens access to 
courts.”1 
 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 2  the Supreme Court of the United States 
considered whether Respondent Javaid Iqbal‘s claims against two 
executive-level government supervisors asserting a qualified immunity 
defense were sufficient to withstand dismissal.
3
  Extending a plausibility 
standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motions 4  to all civil actions and limiting 
supervisory liability in Bivens cases 5  to the government officials‘ own 
purposeful constitutional violations, the Court held that Iqbal had failed to 
allege facts giving rise to a plausible inference that Petitioners John 
Ashcroft and Ronald Mueller were personally liable for his grievances.6  In 
so holding, the Court refused to evaluate the complaint as a whole, thereby 
erroneously categorizing certain allegations as legal conclusions and 
 
Copyright © 2010 by Cara Shepley. 
* Cara Shepley is a second-year law student at the University of Maryland School of Law 
and a staff member for the Maryland Law Review.  Special thanks to Rajni K. Sekhri, Editor in 
Chief; Lindsay S. Goldberg, Executive Notes and Comments Editor; Emily R. Lipps, Notes and 
Comments Editor; and Kerstin M. Miller, Senior Online Articles Editor for their tremendous 
effort and help throughout the publishing process.  Thanks also to The Honorable Judge Benson 
E. Legg, United States District Court for the District of Maryland, and to his clerks for their 
support and advice and for suggesting that the best way to understand plausibility might just be to 
look at an actual complaint or two. 
 1. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 2. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 3. Id. at 1942–43. 
 4. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007) (holding invalid a 
Section 1 Sherman Act violation complaint that included only conclusory assertions of ―parallel 
conduct,‖ thereby failing to provide the Court with ―plausible grounds to infer an agreement‖). 
 5. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
389 (1971) (recognizing an implied private cause of action for damages against federal officers 
who had allegedly violated plaintiff‘s constitutional rights). 
 6. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950–51, 1953.  
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exemplifying the degree to which a discretionary ―plausibility‖ standard 
can lead to arbitrary dismissals based on a judge or Justice‘s individualized 
understanding of that single ambiguous word.7  In extending Twombly‘s 
highly flexible plausibility standard to all civil complaints faced with 
motions to dismiss—despite the fact that such an extension was 
unnecessary to resolve the case—the Court engaged in an act of judicial fiat 
unprecedented in the context of Rule 8. 8   Finally, the Court failed to 
acknowledge its veiled reliance on the post-September 11th context when it 
effectively immunized two high-level officials without considering the 
merits of either qualified immunity or supervisory liability in relation to 
Iqbal‘s claims.9   Having been cited numerous times by lower courts,10 
Iqbal has had an enormous practical impact beyond its oblique 
endorsements of judicial activism and non-accountability in high-level 
government officials.11  If the Court had addressed the issue of qualified 
immunity, it could have resolved Iqbal‘s case more transparently without 
breaking with the long-standing motion to dismiss standard.12  Iqbal would 
therefore never have become a controversial landmark procedural case with 
implications that are—at worst—unconstitutional, and—at best—ethically 
dubious.13 
I.  THE CASE 
On November 5, 2001, during the immediate aftermath of the 
September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, a Muslim Pakistani 
man named Javaid Iqbal was arrested on criminal charges related to 
fraudulent identification documents and conspiracy to defraud the United 
States.14  After his arrest, Iqbal was initially detained at the Metropolitan 
Detention Center (―MDC‖) in Brooklyn, New York. 15   He was then 
transferred to the MDC‘s Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit 
(―ADMAX SHU‖), having been classified as a person ―‗of high interest‘‖ 
 
 7. See infra Part IV.A.  
 8. See infra Part IV.B. 
 9. See infra Part IV.C. 
 10. As of May 16, 2010, Iqbal had been cited nearly 23,100 times according to Westlaw‘s 
citing references.   
 11. See infra Part IV.A.  
 12. See infra Part IV.C. 
 13. See infra Part IV.C.  
 14. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809-JG-SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1 & n.1 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d 
Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).    
 15. Id. at *1.   
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to ongoing government terrorist investigation. 16   He remained at the 
ADMAX SHU from January 8, 2002, until the end of July 2002.17  During 
his detention, Iqbal pled guilty to the criminal charges for which he had 
been arrested, and on September 17, 2002, he was sentenced to sixteen 
months in prison.18  Having been transferred back to the general prison 
population from the ADMAX SHU in July, Iqbal served the remainder of 
his sentence there before being removed to Pakistan on January 15, 2003.19 
In May 2004, Iqbal filed a lengthy twenty-one count complaint against 
the United States and numerous federal officers of various rank, asserting 
constitutional and statutory violations stemming from allegedly egregious 
conditions of confinement during his detention in the ADMAX SHU.20  
Iqbal claimed that thousands of Arab Muslim men were arrested and 
detained in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation‘s (―FBI‖) 
post-September 11th investigations.21  Like many of these detainees, Iqbal 
asserted he had been classified by the FBI as an individual ―of high 
interest‖ solely because of his race, religion, and national origin, rather than 
on the basis of evidence that he was involved in terrorist activities. 22  
According to the complaint, then-United States Attorney General John 
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller had approved a policy of holding 
―high interest‖ detainees in ―highly restrictive conditions until they were 
 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at *1 n.1. 
 19. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 149. 
 20. Id. at 149 & n.3 (seeking damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).  Iqbal filed his original complaint with co-plaintiff 
Ehab Elmaghraby, a Muslim man from Egypt who was also arrested on criminal charges unrelated 
to terrorism, deemed an individual of ―high interest,‖ and detained in the ADMAX SHU.  
Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809-JG-SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1 & n.1.  
Elmaghraby‘s claims, however, were settled by the United States for $300,000 after the district 
court ruled on the defendants‘ motion to dismiss and were never a part of the case on appeal.  
Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 147.  Along with the United States, the complaint named a mass of individual 
government-officer defendants ranging from John Ashcroft, the Attorney General of the United 
States at the time of Iqbal and Elmaghraby‘s arrests, and Robert Mueller, then-Director of the 
FBI, to various high-ranking FBI and Federal Bureau of Prisons employees, MDC wardens, and 
low-ranking corrections officers.  Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1.  In addition to various 
claims filed under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the 
Alien Tort Claims Act, Iqbal alleged numerous violations of his constitutional rights under the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments based on substantive and procedural due 
process, excessive force, interference with the right to counsel, denial of medical treatment, 
egregious conditions of confinement, unreasonable strip and body cavity searches, interference 
with religious practice, religious discrimination, and race-based equal protection.  Iqbal, 490 F.3d 
at 149 n.3.  At issue were allegations deriving from Iqbal‘s detention in the ADMAX SHU, but 
not from his arrest or initial MDC detention.  Id. at 148. 
 21. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 148. 
 22. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *2. 
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‗cleared‘ by the FBI.‖23  Accordingly, Federal Bureau of Prisons (―BOP‖) 
officers directed MDC staff to subject such detainees to the most restrictive 
conditions of confinement possible at the ADMAX facility and to develop 
―procedures‖ for handling them.24  Iqbal claimed that these procedures, 
which included nearly constant confinement to a prison cell, no-contact 
social and legal visits, video monitoring, and communications blackouts, 
were implemented without individual review of any kind and continued 
until the FBI specifically approved a detainee‘s release from the ADMAX 
SHU.25   
Along with the other defendants, Ashcroft and Mueller moved to 
dismiss Iqbal‘s complaint on a number of grounds, including qualified 
immunity.26   Judge Gleeson of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York relied on a standard under which motions to 
dismiss could only be granted ―if ‗it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief.‘‖27  Judge Gleeson also explained that, on one hand, in addition to 
overcoming this general standard, government officials asserting a qualified 
immunity defense will only prevail on pre-discovery motions to dismiss 
when the plaintiff has alleged facts indicating that the official either did not 
violate a ―clearly established‖ statutory or constitutional right, or, from an 
objectively reasonable perspective, did not believe that he had done so.28  
On the other hand, however, because government officials may not be held 
liable in a Bivens action under a theory of respondeat superior, a plaintiff 
must plead and prove the official‘s personal involvement in the alleged 
violations to withstand a motion to dismiss.29  Judge Gleeson clarified that 
 
 23. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 148. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  Regarding his personal experience as an ADMAX SHU detainee, Iqbal specifically 
alleged that he was: kept in solitary confinement where he was often forced to endure nearly 
twenty-four-hour stretches with his cell lights on; punitively subjected to harsh weather conditions 
when he was let outdoors in handcuffs and shackles; so deprived of adequate food that he lost 
forty pounds; verbally abused; twice brutally beaten by MDC guards and otherwise physically 
abused on a regular basis; denied medical care; subjected to daily strip and body-cavity searches; 
prevented from praying and sometimes deprived of his Koran; and blocked from communicating 
with his defense attorney.  Id. at 149.   
 26. Id. at 150. 
 27. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *9.  Judge Gleeson also noted an obligation to accept 
as true all of Iqbal‘s factual allegations and to construe all reasonable inferences in his favor.  Id. 
(citing Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.3d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1992)).   
 28. Id. at *10–11 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see also id. (citing 
McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 434, 436, 443 (2d Cir. 2004), for the proposition that a 
qualified immunity defense, though possible on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, presents a 
formidable procedural hurdle for defendants).  
 29. Id. at *11 (―The expectation that a defendant will assert qualified immunity as a defense 
does not elevate a plaintiff‘s pleading requirements.‖ (citing McKenna, 386 F.3d at 434)). 
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the ―personal involvement‖ of a supervisor must consist of an actual, direct 
constitutional violation, knowledge of and failure to remedy a wrong, the 
creation or sanction of an unconstitutional policy or custom, grossly 
negligent supervision of subordinates who commit constitutional torts, or 
failure to act upon receiving information regarding unconstitutional acts.30  
In other words, ―[m]ere linkage‖ in the chain of command could not 
provide a sufficient basis for supervisory liability.31 
Noting that the parties disagreed as to how ―specific‖ and 
―‗nonconclusory‘‖ an allegation of personal involvement must be, Judge 
Gleeson reasoned that a tension exists between Rule 8‘s liberal pleading 
standards and qualified immunity‘s core purpose of protecting government 
officials from the burdens of discovery in unmeritorious litigation.32  Judge 
Gleeson acknowledged that the Supreme Court had repeatedly declined to 
raise the pleading standard,33 and had (1) endorsed a liberal reading of Rule 
8 as requiring no more than ―fair notice,‖ (2) concluded that courts should 
construe all inferences in the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, including 
inferences that would defeat an immunity defense, (3) emphasized that 
factual disputes regarding qualified immunity should be resolved as early in 
the litigation as possible, and (4) suggested that limited discovery may be 
required to resolve such a dispute.34  
As a result, Judge Gleeson refused to dismiss Iqbal‘s due process 
claim against Ashcroft and Mueller. 35   He reasoned that Iqbal had 
sufficiently asserted the existence of a clearly established liberty interest 
and that he had adequately pled personal involvement of the high-level 
government officials.36  Moreover, the available evidence was so limited 
 
 30. Id. at *14.  Judge Gleeson rejected Ashcroft‘s blanket argument that he should not be 
subject to liability on the basis of ―‗special factors‘‖ in the post-September 11th context militating 
against the provision of a Bivens remedy.  Id.  The court of appeals agreed.  Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 
159–60.  
 31. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *15. 
 32. Id. at *11. 
 33. Id. at *11 & n.13 (deeming the current Rule 8 pleading standard ―permissive‖). 
 34. Id. at *13. 
 35. Id. at *17, *21.  Judge Gleeson also rejected Ashcroft‘s suggestion that ―as a matter of 
law, constitutional and statutory rights must be suspended during times of crisis‖ and national 
emergency.  Id. at *18.  Conceding that Ashcroft‘s argument, which reasoned that the post-
September 11th context justified departure from usual BOP standards, might ultimately persuade a 
court not to impose liability, the judge concluded that a determination of whether the defendants‘ 
actions were reasonable could not be made on a motion to dismiss.  Id. at *19. 
 36. Id. at *19–21 (citing Nuclear Transport & Storage, Inc. v. United States, 890 F.2d 1348, 
1355 (6th Cir. 1989), for the proposition that ordinarily the mere assertion that high-level 
government officials had created an unconstitutional policy would not sufficiently suggest 
personal involvement to state a claim, but reasoning that the post-September 11th context 
provided enough support for Iqbal‘s assertion to warrant some discovery because the need for 
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that Judge Gleeson was reluctant to grant defendants‘ motion without some 
discovery, especially since ―the extent of defendants‘ involvement is 
peculiarly within their knowledge.‖37  To mitigate concerns animating the 
qualified immunity doctrine, however, Judge Gleeson limited initial 
discovery to the issue of defendants‘ personal involvement.38  
Turning finally to Iqbal‘s First and Fifth Amendment claims of 
religious and racial discrimination, Judge Gleeson explained that although 
proof of discriminatory intent is required for a plaintiff to prevail under 
equal protection principles, no such proof is required at the pleading 
stage.39  Because he could not conclude that there existed ―no set of facts‖ 
consistent with Iqbal‘s allegation that Ashcroft was the ―principle architect‖ 
of the discriminatory policy that could establish the latter‘s liability, Judge 
Gleeson also refused to dismiss these claims.40   
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the supervisory defendants 
challenged on qualified immunity grounds the district court‘s refusal to 
dismiss Iqbal‘s claims against them. 41   Agreeing with Judge Gleeson‘s 
legal conclusions, including his explanation of supervisory liability, the 
court of appeals echoed the district court‘s suggestion that the proper 
pleading standard required ―to overcome a qualified immunity defense‖ 
was an ―unsettled question.‖42  Utilizing a newer standard than had Judge 
Gleeson,43 the court relied on three somewhat conflicting Supreme Court 
cases44  and noted that most circuits had rejected a generally applicable 
heightened pleading standard—until the Supreme Court‘s decision in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.45 
 
immediate, authoritative action made it more likely that high-level officials were personally 
involved in creating and/or implementing the detention policy).   
 37. Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *20–21.   
 38. Id. at *21. 
 39. Id. at *28–29. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 2007).  The only defendants to appeal the 
district court‘s order were supervisory officials.  Id. at 152. 
 42. Id. at 152–53. 
 43. In 2007, the Supreme Court abrogated the ―no set of facts‖ standard that Judge Gleeson 
had correctly applied to Iqbal‘s case in 2005.  See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
562–63 (2007).  
 44. See Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 153–55 (parsing through and synthesizing the analyses of 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), and Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 
(1998)).   
 45. See Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 155 (noting the First Circuit‘s assertion in Educadores 
Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2004), that Swierkiewicz had 
resolved in the negative any lingering question whether a heightened pleading standard may still 
be possible after Crawford-El).  
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Twombly, the court opined, had created ―[c]onsiderable uncertainty‖ 
regarding the proper pleading standard for motions to dismiss because 
conflicting ―signals‖ in the opinion could imply either that the new 
plausibility standard should be construed narrowly, applying only to 
antitrust cases, or broadly, subjecting all civil actions to ―a new and 
heightened pleading standard.‖ 46   Carefully analyzing these conflicting 
signals, the court concluded that the Supreme Court had not meant to 
announce a universally heightened standard but intended instead to require 
a flexible plausibility standard demanding amplified factual allegations only 
―in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim 
plausible.‖47   
In so concluding, the court acknowledged that Ashcroft and Mueller‘s 
argument for a heightened pleading standard in Iqbal‘s case had some merit 
to the extent that such a standard would support the important privilege of 
qualified immunity while blocking generalized allegations of supervisory 
liability with the potential to create the exact discovery burdens that 
qualified immunity was designed to prevent. 48   The court declined to 
impose such a standard but noted that courts denying 12(b)(6) motions by 
government officials claiming immunity should structure and manage 
discovery to shield the officials from expensive, time-consuming 
litigation.49  
Accepting Iqbal‘s factual allegations as true and applying Twombly‘s 
plausibility standard, the court dismissed the procedural due process 
claims.50  Reasoning that Iqbal had sufficiently alleged both the violation of 
a constitutional right and the personal involvement of the relevant 
defendants—including Ashcroft and Mueller—in violating that right, the 
court concluded that there was a legitimate question as to whether the right 
was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.51  As to the 
equal protection claims, the court found that Iqbal‘s allegation that his 
classification and confinement were solely race-based was sufficient to 
state a claim of objectively illegal animus-based discrimination, Ashcroft 
and Mueller‘s assertion of qualified immunity notwithstanding.52  Noting 
that the Supreme Court had specifically rejected a heightened pleading 
 
 46. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 155. 
 47. Id. at 157–58 (failing to elaborate on or give examples of contexts that would require 
amplified pleading).   
 48. Id. at 158–59 (underscoring a district court‘s obligation to manage cases with a qualified 
immunity defense in such a way as to ―protect the substance‖ of that defense). 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 164–68 (reasoning that dismissal is warranted when there exists a legitimate 
question as to whether there is an exception to a constitutional requirement). 
 51. Id. at 167–68.  
 52. Id. at 174. 
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requirement for improperly motivated civil rights violations, the court 
turned to the issue of personal involvement to conclude that Iqbal‘s 
assertions that Ashcroft had designed the discriminatory policy and that 
Ashcroft and Mueller had condoned and agreed to it were sufficiently 
plausible.53  
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide 
(1) whether Iqbal‘s complaint had sufficiently stated a claim that petitioners 
Ashcroft and Mueller had deprived him of a constitutional right, and (2) 
whether a high-ranking government official may be held liable for 
unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the basis of knowledge and 
acquiescence in those acts.54 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Pleading practice in the United States developed from an archaic set of 
technical requirements to a lenient and long-lasting regime based on fair 
notice that was memorialized in the landmark case Conley v. Gibson.
55
  In 
2007, the Supreme Court shattered this regime with its decision in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, which introduced a new plausibility standard for 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and whose interpretation and 
potential scope created a significant amount of confusion in the lower 
federal courts.
56
  While the Court has traditionally taken the view that 
procedural rules should be amended through the official federal rulemaking 
process rather than from the bench, Justice Kennedy has suggested that a 
heightened pleading standard may be appropriate in the context of a 
qualified immunity defense.
57
  Qualified immunity is a doctrine that seeks 
to balance the goal of preventing disruptive litigation against government 
officials against justice‘s demand in some instances for limited pre-
dismissal discovery.
58
 
 
 53. Id. at 175–76 (echoing Judge Gleeson‘s reasoning that the post-September 11th context 
increased the likelihood that high-level government officials would have been personally involved 
in designing and implementing confinement policies for people who were arrested on federal 
charges in the New York City area and then classified as ―of high interest‖ in terrorism 
investigations). 
 54. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1955–56 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari at *29, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (No. 07-1015)).  Writing for the Court, 
Justice Kennedy asserted that the case turned on the narrower question of whether Iqbal had pled 
―factual matter that, if taken as true, state[d] a claim that [Ashcroft and Mueller] deprived him of 
his clearly established constitutional rights.‖  Id. at 1942–43 (majority opinion).   
 55. See infra Part II.A. 
 56. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 57. See infra Part II.D. 
 58. See infra Part II.E. 
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A.  The Evolution of Pleading: From Archaic Codes and Common Law 
to the Advent of Rule 8 and the Notice Regime 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is the product of an ongoing 
procedural evolution.  United States pleading practice developed from an 
arcane, oppressive set of common-law and Code procedures into a pro-
plaintiff approach under which a complaint survived dismissal unless it 
failed to give the defendant fair but general notice of the claim.59  Once the 
Court officially announced this construction of Rule 8 in Conley v. 
Gibson,60 however, the pleading standard evolution came to an apparent 
end.61  
At common law, a ―Byzantine‖62 pleading system required plaintiffs 
to navigate a complex series of highly scientific-like requirements dictating 
how to properly recite claims and relevant legal issues.63  Pleadings that 
failed to adhere to these technical constraints were swiftly dismissed, such 
that the system‘s formal rigidity trumped the promotion of justice through 
principled decisions based on the merits of each case.64  In America, the 
ancient pleading system was first reformed in 1848 with the enactment of 
the New York Field Codes.65  The Codes, which shifted the substantive 
core of pleading practice from issues to facts, required plaintiffs to submit 
―a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting each cause of action 
without unnecessary repetition.‖ 66   Like the common-law system, the 
Codes eventually revealed defects, most notably the underlying assumption 
 
 59. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1202, at 89–92 (3d ed. 2004). 
 60. 355 U.S. 41, 45–47 (1957) (explaining that the Rules require only that the plaintiff ―give 
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff‘s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests‖). 
 61. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor their judicial interpretation departed 
from notice pleading until 2007.  See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 
(2007) (―Conley‘s ‗no set of facts‘ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away 
long enough.‖). 
 62. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573–74 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that the language 
of Rule 8 was ―not inadvertent,‖ but rather an intentional response to the difficulties associated 
with hyper-technical English and American pleading rules from the mid-nineteenth century). 
 63. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 59, § 1202, at 90 (explaining that the ―maze‖ of 
common-law pleading requirements was premised on the assumption that ―eventually the dispute 
would be reduced to a single issue of law or fact that would dispose of the case‖). 
 64. Id. at 90–92.  See generally J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL 
HISTORY 53–57, 76–79, 86–90 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing the early English writ system, the first 
form of pleading practice, and the decline of the common-law system of pleading, which resulted 
from its inflexibility). 
 65. See generally CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 21–22 
(2d ed. 1947) (―In this country the movement for pleading reform resulted in the adoption of the 
New York [Field] Code of 1848, the mode and forerunner of all the practice codes in states which 
have adopted code pleading.‖).  
 66. Id. at 210 (citing N.Y. CODE CIV. P. § 481).   
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that plaintiffs could compartmentalize facts and conclusions at the first 
stage of litigation.67   Fact pleading under the Codes ultimately became 
unworkable, having imposed enormous time and cost expenditures in 
litigating inconsequential procedural issues.68  
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted in 1938, Rule 
8 was designed to respond to the technical deficiencies of both the common 
law and the Codes: The drafters intentionally excluded references to both 
―facts‖ and ―causes of action.‖69  In so doing, the drafters also abolished the 
problematic formal distinction between facts and conclusions.70  Having 
only been amended twice since its promulgation,71 Rule 8(a)(2) requires ―a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.‖72  This intentionally simplified standard was complemented by Rule 
8‘s explicit directive of interpretive flexibility: Pleadings must be construed 
in such a way as to promote and achieve justice.73   
Because the drafters of the Federal Rules sought to expand access to 
the courts, they used Rule 8 to clear away the confusion and injustice of 
rigid procedural rules ―so that the sunlight of substance might shine 
through.‖74  Pleading under Rule 8 did not demand detailed allegations that 
would ultimately prove a claim but only required enough information to 
 
 67. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 59, § 1218, at 265.  
 68. Id. § 1202, at 91–92. 
 69. Id. § 1216, at 207–08 (explaining that the drafters ―obviously felt that the use of a new 
formulation would . . . destroy the viability of the old code precedents, which were a source of 
considerable confusion, and encourage a more flexible approach by the courts in defining the 
concept of claim for relief‖).   
 70. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 574–75 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting that because Rule 8 was enacted in direct response to the difficulty of distinguishing 
between facts and legal conclusions, its drafters self-consciously avoided any reference to these 
terms); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 3–4 (9th Cir. 1963) (―[O]ne 
purpose of Rule 8 was to get away from the highly technical distinction between statements of 
fact and conclusions of law . . . .‖); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int‘l Union v. Delta Ref. Co., 
277 F.2d 694, 697 (6th Cir. 1960) (suggesting that under notice pleading, ―the ancient distinction 
between pleading ‗facts‘ and ‗conclusions‘ is no longer significant‖). 
 71. The Court has only ordered amendments to Rule 8 three times since the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure were first enacted; Rule 8(a)(2) was only affected by two of those orders and has 
never been amended substantively.  See 113 F.R.D. 189, 194–95 (1987) (making technical 
changes); 39 F.R.D. 69, 214 (1966) (amending Rule 8(e) only); Order of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/PendingRules/ProposedSupCt040
7.aspx (effective Dec. 1, 2007) (making stylistic changes).   
 72. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).   
 73. See WRIGHT & MILLER supra note 59, § 1202, at 97 (referring to Rule 8(f), which 
provides that ―all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice‖). 
 74. Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1988).  
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give the defendant and the court notice of that claim.75  As a result, modern 
pleading practice became known as ―notice pleading.‖ 76   According to 
Judge Charles E. Clark, the principal architect of the Federal Rules, giving 
notice meant setting forth the general nature and basis of a claim to clarify 
the act or event a plaintiff sought to litigate. 77   The new, simplified 
pleading standard was, moreover, complemented and enabled by the 
introduction of liberal discovery rules and other pretrial procedures, which 
allowed litigants who had given proper notice of their claims to gather 
evidence regarding the specific legal issues on which their case would 
ultimately turn.78  In 1954, a few years before its landmark case of the 
notice pleading regime—Conley v. Gibson79—the Court paved the way for 
that decision by implicitly endorsing a minimalist pleading standard.80  In 
United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass’n of Chicago, the Court 
suggested that a complaint could actually be ―too long and too detailed in 
view of the modern practice looking to simplicity and reasonable brevity in 
pleading.‖81   
In Conley, the Supreme Court definitively interpreted Rule 8 and 
clarified its interaction with Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss 82 : ―[A] 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support 
 
 75. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 59, § 1202, at 89–90. 
 76. Although the drafters did not  use the term ―notice pleading,‖ Charles E. Clark, Pleading 
Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958), the Supreme Court did so in Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957) (―Such simplified ‗notice pleading‘ is made possible by the 
liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules . . . .‖).  
The Court has also included the term ―simplified‖ in describing the appropriate standard.  See, 
e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (―Rule 8(a)‘s simplified pleading 
standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions.‖).  
 77. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460–61 (1943) (espousing the 
necessity of simple, direct procedural rules that, in addressing only the ―broad outlines‖ of a case, 
do not allow form to rise above substance).  
 78. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (explaining that the ―simplified notice pleading 
standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions‖); Conley, 355 U.S. at 
47 (noting that ―simplified ‗notice pleading‘ is made possible by the liberal opportunity for 
discovery and the other pretrial procedures‖); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (―The 
new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the 
deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial.‖).  
 79. 355 U.S. 41. 
 80. See United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass‘n of Chi., 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954) 
(embracing a simplistic pleading standard). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) grants parties the right to move for dismissal of 
complaints that ―fail[] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.‖  FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6). 
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of his claim which would entitle him to relief.‖83  Plaintiff-petitioners were 
African-American railroad employees who sued their union and some of its 
officers under the Railway Labor Act for unfair bargaining-agent 
representation after they had been discharged or demoted, allegedly on the 
basis of race.84  In response to the Union‘s argument that the employees‘ 
complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to support a general allegation of 
discrimination, the Court reasoned that because the underlying purpose of 
pleading is to foster adjudication on the merits, the Federal Rules did not 
require detailed factual allegations.85  To withstand a motion to dismiss, the 
Court concluded, a complaint must only allege enough information to give 
the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff‘s claims and their grounds. 86  
Therefore, the employees‘ allegations that the railroad had wrongfully 
discharged them and that the Union had because of their race refused to 
assist them in dealing with their grievances provided sufficient notice to 
defeat the Union‘s motion to dismiss.87  
Until Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,88 the Court consistently applied 
Conley‘s ―no set of facts‖ standard—or its underlying rationale—to 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.89  Accordingly, the Court 
determined that the task of evaluating a complaint before discovery was a 
necessarily limited undertaking that required judges to carefully distinguish 
between complaints that were sufficiently pleaded but that suggested an 
improbability that the claimant would succeed on the merits, and 
complaints that actually failed to sufficiently state a claim. 90   In 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,91 for instance, the Court affirmed that the 
 
 83. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 562–63, 570 (2007) (abrogating Conley‘s ―no set of facts‖ language but purporting not 
to raise the pleading standard).  
 84. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43. 
 85. Id. at 47–48. 
 86. Id at 47. 
 87. Id. at 45–46. 
 88. 550 U.S. 544. 
 89. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (citing Conley for the 
proposition that ―[t]he liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified 
pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim‖).  In fact, even 
after Twombly, the Court referred approvingly to Conley‘s notice pleading standard.  See Erickson 
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing language from Conley quoted in Twombly to assert that a 
complaint need only ―‗give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests‘‖ (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).  
 90. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (―The issue is not whether a plaintiff 
will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.  
Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but 
that is not the test.‖). 
 91. 534 U.S. 506. 
2010] ASHCROFT v. IQBAL 81 
 
simplified standard of Rule 8 applied to all civil actions and had been 
adopted to shift the focus of litigation from the art of pleading claims to the 
merits involved in adjudicating them.92  Further, in Leatherman v. Tarrant 
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,93 the Court rejected as 
inconsistent with the liberal system of notice pleading the Fifth Circuit‘s 
requirement that plaintiffs suing government officials likely to evoke a 
qualified immunity defense must ―state with factual detail and particularity 
the basis for the claim‖ as well as the basis for a rebuttal to the immunity 
argument.94  The Court declined to adopt the challengers‘ rationale that this 
requirement did not constitute a heightened pleading standard because the 
Federal Rules demand varying degrees of factual specificity depending on 
the substantive complexities of the legal doctrines underlying the plaintiff‘s 
claims.95   
The lower federal courts adopted the Supreme Court‘s pleading 
pronouncements.  In a case decided only one month before Twombly, Judge 
Easterbrook underscored the Seventh Circuit‘s understanding of the Court‘s 
construction of Rule 8 by cautioning district court judges considering 
motions to dismiss to be vigilant in demanding nothing more from a 
complaint than notice. 96   According to Judge Easterbrook, Rule 8 
demanded neither facts nor legal theories, both of which would emerge later 
in the litigation process.97  The judge concluded that 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss should be granted only when a complaint fails to state a legally 
cognizable claim.98 
B.  From Notice to Plausibility: In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the 
Court Departed from Conley v. Gibson’s Long-Standing “No Set of 
 
 92. Id. at 514–15. 
 93. 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
 94. Id. at 167–68 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 95. Id. 
 96. Vincent v. City Colleges of Chi., 485 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 2007) (―Any decision 
declaring ‗this complaint is deficient because it does not allege X‘ is a candidate for summary 
reversal, unless X is on the list in Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).‖ (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Kolupa v. Roselle Park Dist., 438 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 2006))).  Later in the opinion, 
Judge Easterbrook offered even more specific advice on this score, suggesting that ―[a]ny district 
judge (for that matter, any defendant) tempted to write ‗this complaint is deficient because it does 
not contain . . .‘ should stop and think: What rule of law requires a complaint to contain that 
allegation?‖ Id. at 924 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 
708 (7th Cir. 2005)).  
 97. Id. at 923 (reasoning that a complaint‘s indication of ―the possibility that facts to be 
adduced later, and consistent with the complaint, could prove the claim‖ precludes pre-discovery 
dismissal).  
 98. Id. at 924. 
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Facts” Language and Adopted a Plausibility Pleading Standard in 
the Context of an Antitrust Action 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,99  the Supreme Court abrogated 
Conley‘s oft-quoted ―no set of facts‖ interpretation of Rule 8, reasoning that 
the phrase had been often and problematically taken out of context by the 
lower courts and that it had been ―questioned, criticized, and explained 
away long enough.‖100  The Twombly plaintiff-respondents were consumers 
of local telephone and/or high-speed Internet services who sued Bell 
Atlantic and other Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (―ILEC‖)—regional 
service monopolies—under Section 1 of the Sherman Act in a putative class 
action101 for conspiracy to restrain trade.102  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Souter found the allegation that the telecommunications providers had 
―engaged in parallel conduct‖ insufficient to state an antitrust violation and 
therefore held that the complaint should be dismissed.103  In so holding, 
Justice Souter considered the complaint under a new standard that enabled 
him to declare that an assertion of parallel conduct alone did not plausibly 
suggest an unlawful conspiracy on the part of the ILECs.104   
To replace Conley‘s (mis)interpretation of Rule 8, the Court 
introduced new language declaring that a complaint will only withstand 
dismissal if it includes, on its face, ―allegations plausibly suggesting (not 
merely consistent with)‖ liability.105  Plausibility, Justice Souter explained, 
implies neither probability106  nor conceivability,107  but falls somewhere 
between the two and cannot be based on conclusory assertions that would 
require a judge to speculate about whether the plaintiff is entitled to 
 
 99. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  The Court framed its reason for granting certiorari narrowly: ―[T]o 
address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel 
conduct.‖  Id. at 553. 
 100. Id. at 562–63 (retiring the ―puzzling‖ phrase as one ―best forgotten as an incomplete, 
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may 
be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint‖). 
 101. Id. at 550, 559 (noting the potentially exorbitant discovery costs associated with a case in 
which ―plaintiffs represent a putative class of at least 90 percent of all subscribers to local 
telephone or high-speed Internet service in the continental United States‖). 
 102. Id. at 550.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits ―[e]very contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations.‖  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).    
 103.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (concluding that plaintiffs had not ―nudged their claims across 
the line from conceivable to plausible‖). 
 104. See id. at 564–70 (noting that ―we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, 
but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face‖).  
 105. Id. at 556–57 (explaining that a facially plausible pleading ―simply calls for enough facts 
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal‖ activity).   
 106. Id. at 556. 
 107. Id. at 570. 
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relief. 108   Like labels and conclusions, ―a formulaic recitation of the 
elements of a cause of action‖ cannot alone give rise to a plausible 
inference of liability.109  The Court explicitly rejected any requirement of 
―heightened fact pleading of specifics‖ and framed the decision as a logical 
extension of the Court‘s pleading philosophy rather than a departure from 
it.110 
Justice Stevens dissented, 111  asserting that the Court‘s plausibility 
test—which he interpreted as a ―dramatic departure from settled procedural 
[standards]‖ 112 —was not a legally acceptable basis for dismissing a 
complaint.113  Examining the history of Rule 8,114 Justice Stevens pointed 
out that plaintiffs had difficulty distinguishing among facts, evidence, and 
conclusions under the Codes and suggested that rather than a bright line 
separating a conceivable complaint from a plausible one, there existed a 
pleading ―continuum varying only in the degree of particularity with which 
the occurrences are described.‖115  After rebutting the majority‘s suggestion 
that Conley had put an ―incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading 
standard,‖ 116  Justice Stevens concluded that the Court had actually 
heightened that standard117 from possibility to plausibility.118 
 
 108. Id. at 555–56. 
 109. Id. at 555.  Applying the plausibility standard to the facts of the case, Justice Souter first 
outlined the substantive legal requirements underlying the plaintiff‘s claim of an antitrust 
violation.  Id. at 553–54.  He then reasoned that allegations of parallel conduct, without any 
assertion of an actual agreement or conspiracy to unreasonably restrain trade, did not give rise to 
the plausible inference of a Section 1 Sherman Act violation.  Id. at 564–70. 
 110. Id. at 570. 
 111. Justice Stevens was joined in dissent by Justice Ginsberg, except as to Part IV, which 
criticized the majority‘s method of statutory interpretation as applied to Twombly for ignoring 
Congress‘s intent in enacting the Sherman Act in order to advance its own policy agenda of 
―protecting antitrust defendants . . . from the burdens of pretrial discovery.‖  Id. at 547, 595–97 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 112.  Id. at 573 (arguing that the insertion of plausibility into the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis ―seems 
to be driven by the majority‘s appraisal of the plausibility of the ultimate factual allegation rather 
than its legal sufficiency‖). 
 113. Id. at 571. 
 114.  Id. at 573–76 (asserting that Conley must be understood in this context).  Justice Stevens 
lamented Conley‘s interment and pointed out in ―eulogy‖ that the majority opinion ―is the first by 
any Member of this Court to express any doubt as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation.‖  Id. 
at 577–78. 
 115. Id. at 574 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. 
Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 
520–21 (1957)).  
 116. Id. at 579.  First, Justice Stevens explained that, because the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure neither encourage nor require the pleading of facts, the Conley Court would have 
understood the majority‘s introduction of plausibility as erroneously imposing an evidentiary 
standard at the pleading stage.  Id. at 579–80 & n.6 (conceding that the majority was correct in 
asserting that Rule 8 requires only a ―‗showing‘‖ that plaintiff is entitled to relief, and suggesting 
that ―[w]hether and to what extent that ‗showing‘ requires allegations of fact will depend on the 
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C.  Twombly Created Considerable Confusion in the Lower Courts 
and Set the Stage for Supreme Court Clarification 
Twombly instigated a considerable amount of debate and speculation 
in the lower federal courts regarding the scope of the new pleading standard 
and the meaning of plausibility.119  Although the courts generally applied 
Twombly outside of the federal antitrust context, they did so to varying 
degrees. 120   More importantly, some courts found that a plausibility 
requirement squared well with long-standing principles of notice pleading 
while others interpreted it as a significant departure.121  Regardless of how 
a court ultimately construed Twombly, however, each attempted ―neither to 
over-read nor to under-read‖ the Supreme Court‘s new language.122   
 
particulars of the claim‖).  Second, Justice Stevens noted that Conley developed a minimum 
standard with which a complaint must comply to withstand dismissal, not a standard dictating 
what a plaintiff may include in a complaint.  Id. at 580. 
 117. See id. at 588, 596 (calling Twombly a ―Big Case‖ that tempted the majority into 
succumbing to the temptation of imposing a heightened pleading standard, which ―previous 
Courts [had] steadfastly resisted,‖ and asserting ―that the Court has announced a significant new 
rule that does not even purport to respond to any congressional command is glaringly obvious‖ in 
light of the decision‘s ―transparent policy concern‖ of protecting antitrust defendants). 
 118. Id. at 591–93 (rejecting the Court‘s notion that any inference of antitrust conspiracy based 
on the allegation of parallel conduct is implausible and asserting that such inferences ―sit[] 
comfortably within the realm of possibility,‖ which is ―all the Rules require‖).  Justice Stevens 
concluded that ―in the final analysis,‖ the Court‘s decision reflects ―only a lack of confidence in 
the ability of trial judges to control discovery.‖  Id. at 596.  
 119. E.g., Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 541–42 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting 
confusion over Twombly‘s scope but declining to take a position, as doing so was unnecessary for 
resolution of the case).   
 120. Compare Cosmetic Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 48, 54–55 (3d Cir. 
2007) (applying Twombly to affirm a motion for summary judgment under the New Jersey 
Antitrust Act), with Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1286–87 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying 
Twombly to a § 1983 action to hold that a former prisoner‘s complaint failed to state a claim 
against the former city chief of police for unconstitutional denial of access to DNA evidence). 
 121. See Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure & Fed. Practice as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 4, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2008) (No. 07-1015) (―Compare 
Aktieselkaet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (‗Twombly 
leaves the longstanding fundamentals of notice pleading intact.‘), with Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers v. Union Pacific RR Co., 537 F.3d 789, 791 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J., and 
Posner, J., concurring) (‗In Bell Atlantic the Justices modified federal pleading requirements and 
threw out a complaint that would have been deemed sufficient earlier.‘‖)).  The Professors argued 
that the Court in Twombly did not ―endorse or apply‖ a heightened pleading standard, id. at 7–8, 
and reasoned that the implausibility of Twombly‘s complaint ―was a product of substantive law 
filtered through unremarkable pleading standards,‖ id. at 11.  
 122. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1082 (7th Cir. 2008).  The Tenth Circuit, one of 
the few circuits attempting to put into its own words what the Supreme Court meant by 
―plausibility,‖ found that ―the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some 
set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court 
reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for 
these claims.‖  Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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Judge Ripple of the Seventh Circuit asserted in Tamayo v. Blagojevich 
that the Court had not intended to supercede the basic notice-pleading 
standard and assumed that Twombly applied to various types of civil 
actions.123  According to Judge Ripple, Twombly had not heightened the 
pleading standard but had established that a complaint must pass ―‗two 
easy-to-clear hurdles‘‖ to survive a motion to dismiss: First, the complaint 
must contain enough factual detail to give the defendant ―fair notice‖ of the 
plaintiff‘s claims and their grounds; second, that factual detail must also 
―plausibly suggest‖ that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. 124   The court 
interpreted the Supreme Court‘s ―explicit praise of Form 9 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure‖ as suggesting that some conclusory statements 
might permissibly contribute to a plausible inference of entitlement to 
relief.125   
The plaintiff in Tamayo had sued her employers, the Illinois Gaming 
Board and the Illinois Department of Revenue, and individual defendants, 
including Governor Blagojevich, under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and 
Section 1983 for retaliation and gender-based discrimination.126  Tamayo 
alleged that her employers had reneged on a promised salary, treated her 
differently from and paid her less than similarly situated male employees—
in part because she was a woman—and subjected her to various, 
specifically identified ―adverse employment actions‖ on account of her 
gender and in response to her complaints about lack of equal pay and her 
filing of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge.127  Judge 
Ripple concluded that Tamayo‘s complaint had alleged sufficient facts with 
respect to her sex discrimination and retaliation claims, reasoning that the 
allegations put the defendants on adequate notice of her claims, which she 
had not attempted to obfuscate.128   
Like Judge Ripple, Judge Archer of the Federal Circuit concluded in 
McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp. that Twombly‘s abrogation of Conley‘s ―no 
set of facts‖ language did not suggest that the Court had changed the 
 
 123. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1082–83; see also McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 
1356 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (concluding that the Court‘s abrogation of Conley‘s ―no set of facts‖ 
language ―does not suggest that Bell Atlantic changed the pleading requirement of Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8 as articulated in Conley‖ and noting that, in fact, ―Bell Atlantic favorably quoted 
Conley‖). 
 124. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1084 (quoting EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 
776 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
 125. Id. at 1084–85 (suggesting, for instance, that a negligence complaint could survive 
dismissal without stating ―the respects in which the defendant was alleged to be negligent (i.e., 
driving too fast, driving drunk, etc.)‖). 
 126. Id. at 1080. 
 127. Id. at 1085. 
 128. Id. at 1085–86. 
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pleading requirements of Rule 8 ―as articulated in Conley.‖129  In McZeal, 
the pro se plaintiff sued Sprint Nextel Corporation and Nextel 
Communications, Inc. for patent and trademark infringement, setting forth 
his allegations in a ninety-five page, twenty-four count complaint. 130  
Reasoning that McZeal only had access to Sprint‘s public statements and 
advertisements, Judge Archer concluded that McZeal‘s allegation that one 
of Sprint Nextel‘s products was the logical equivalent of his invention—an 
international walkie talkie—contained sufficient detail to allow the 
corporation to answer the complaint with respect to the patent infringement 
claim.131  Specifics about how the allegedly infringing product worked, the 
court reasoned, would emerge through discovery.132  
Although he noted that that courts may ―grant leeway‖ to pro se 
plaintiffs on procedural matters,133 Judge Archer also referred broadly to 
the pleading standard, suggesting that even after Twombly, a complaint will 
withstand dismissal so long as it provides the defendant with ―enough detail 
to allow the defendants to answer.‖134  Rejecting the majority‘s view, Judge 
Dyk concluded that under the new pleading standard announced in 
Twombly, McZeal‘s bare, conclusory allegations of patent infringement 
were insufficient to provide Sprint with any meaningful notice under the 
doctrine of equivalents,135 and therefore should not be permitted to subject 
Sprint to expensive and time-consuming discovery.136 
Seeking to reconcile the long-standing notice requirement with 
Twombly‘s new additions to the pleading standard, Judge Nygaard 
explained for the Third Circuit in Phillips v. County of Allegheny137 that 
what made Twombly‘s impact on Rule 12(b)(6) so confusing was the fact 
that the new plausibility paradigm had been introduced alongside the 
seemingly conflicting assertion that the Court was not actually changing the 
 
 129. 501 F.3d 1354, 1356 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that the Court in Twombly had quoted 
Conley favorably).  
 130. Id. at 1355. 
 131. Id. at 1357.  As for the trademark infringement claim, Judge Archer rejected the district 
court‘s basis for dismissing McZeal‘s complaint, asserting that whether the trademark was 
generic, and therefore invalid, was a factual question that could not be decided on a motion to 
dismiss.  Id. at 1358. 
 132. Id. at 1358.  
 133. Id. at 1356. 
 134. Id. at 1357. 
 135. The doctrine of equivalents, in essence, prevents patent fraud.  See Graver Tank & Mfg. 
Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608–10 (1950) (establishing the modern doctrine of 
equivalents). 
 136. McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1361 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 137. 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008). 
2010] ASHCROFT v. IQBAL 87 
 
framework for Rules 8 or 12(b)(6). 138   According to Judge Nygaard, 
Twombly introduced two new concepts to the assessment of a civil 
complaint. 139   First, the Court introduced new language, such as the 
―showing‖ required to demonstrate entitlement to relief; second, the Court 
renounced old language, that is, Conley‘s ―no set of facts‖ passage.140  
Attempting to make sense of Twombly‘s ―confusing‖ and ―‗conflicting 
signals,‘‖141 the Judge explained that insufficient factual allegations in a 
complaint could not withstand dismissal because such allegations could not 
provide the defendant with sufficient notice.142  The Judge noted that the 
Supreme Court had carefully rooted its analysis of and departure from 
Conley in accepted principles and concluded that Twombly had not 
shattered the notice pleading standard.143 
In Phillips, an administratix sued numerous defendants under Section 
1983 in relation to the murder of her son Mark Phillips and his girlfriend, 
Gretchen Ferderbar, by Ferderbar‘s ex-boyfriend Michael Michalski, an 
Allegheny County 911 call center dispatcher.144  The defendants included 
Daniel Nussbaum, Michalski‘s supervisor, and Danielle Tush and Brian 
Craig, other dispatchers.145  Michalski had secretly used the call center‘s 
computer network to obtain information about the whereabouts of 
Ferderbar  and Phillips.146  When Nussbaum initially became aware of this, 
he suspended Michalski for one week.147  During the suspension, Tush and 
Craig assisted Michalski in obtaining unauthorized information about the 
victims from the call center database.148  Ferderbar learned of Michalski‘s 
actions and notified Nussbaum, who terminated Michalski and then 
contacted Ferderbar and a local police department to warn them about 
Michalski‘s volatile state.149  Later that day, Michalski phoned the call 
 
 138. Id. at 230. 
 139. Id. at 231–32. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 234 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007)).  
 142. Id. at 232 (contrasting the necessary ―showing‖ to a ―blanket assertion of entitlement to 
relief‖). 
 143. Id. at 233.  Like the Third and Seventh Circuits, the Second Circuit recognized 
―conflicting signals‖ in Twombly that created uncertainty as to the opinion‘s intended scope.  
Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157–58 & n.7 (concluding that Twombly was not limited to antitrust cases and 
reasoning that ―it would be cavalier to believe that the Court‘s rejection of the ‗no set of facts‘ 
language from Conley . . . applies only to section 1 antitrust claims‖).  
 144. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228–29 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 145. Id. at 229.    
 146. Id. at 228. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 229. 
 149. Id. 
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center, saying he had ―‗nothing left to live for‘‖ and that Ferderbar and 
Phillips were going to ―‗pay for putting him in his present situation,‘‖ but 
neither Tush nor Craig nor any other dispatcher took any action to warn 
Ferderbar or to notify the police.150  That evening, Michalski tracked down 
and shot Ferderbar and Phillips.151 
Judge Nygaard applied Twombly and analyzed the complaint under the 
four-part test of the state-created danger theory.152  The judge found that 
the claims were pled insufficiently against Nussbaum because they did not 
allege that he had acted affirmatively.153  As for Tush and Craig, however, 
the judge concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged that both 
dispatchers had acted affirmatively in providing Michalski with 
unauthorized call center information and that there was a direct causal 
relationship between this action and the murders, since Michalski had used 
the call center information to locate the victims. 154   In addition, the 
complaint alleged that Tush and Craig were actually aware of the risk of 
harm, since they knew that Mikulski was in a distraught mental state as a 
result of his break-up with Ferderbar.155  Finally, the complaint sufficiently 
established that Tush and Craig had acted with deliberate indifference, 
which raised their culpability to the level of conscience-shocking and 
satisfied the final prong of the test.156   Therefore, under Twombly, the 
district court erred in dismissing Phillips‘s claims against the 
dispatchers.157  
Erickson v. Pardus, 158  a brief per curiam decision issued by the 
Supreme Court only a few weeks after Twombly, 159  added further 
confusion to the debate over Twombly‘s scope and meaning.  In Erickson, a 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 235.  The state-created danger theory is an exception to the general rule that States 
have no obligation to act affirmatively to protect their citizens.  Under the four-part test, a plaintiff 
must plead and prove: 
(1) the harm ultimately caused to the plaintiff was foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the 
state-actor acted in willful disregard for the plaintiff‘s safety; (3) there was some 
relationship between the state and the plaintiff; and (4) the state-actor used his authority 
to create an opportunity for danger that otherwise would not have existed. 
Id. 
 153. Id. at 236.  Rather than affirming the district court‘s dismissal of the claims against 
Nussbaum, Judge Nygaard remanded them to give Phillips an opportunity to amend the 
complaint.  Id. 
 154. Id. at 237. 
 155. Id. at 238.  
 156. Id. at 241. 
 157. Id. at 243. 
 158. 551 U.S. 89 (2007). 
 159. Twombly was decided on May 21, 2007.  Erickson was decided on June 4. 
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Section 1983 action against medic prison officials that turned on the 
sufficiency of a pro se complaint,160 the Court quoted Conley, via Twombly, 
in acknowledging the ―fair notice‖ standard and reasoned that a Rule 8 
―[short and plain] statement need only ‗give the defendant fair notice of 
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.‘‖ 161  
Emphasizing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set forth ―liberal 
pleading standards,‖ the Court rejected the contention that Erickson‘s 
allegations were ―too conclusory‖ to state Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment violations for cruel and unusual punishment.162  The Court 
reasoned that the allegations in Erickson‘s complaint—that a prison doctor 
had removed him from a year-long hepatitis C treatment program, that 
prison officials refused to provide necessary medical treatment, and that 
lack of treatment endangered his life—were sufficient under Rule 8(a)(2), 
even without Erickson‘s additional, more specific allegations.163 
D.  Although the Court Has Often Declined to Amend the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure from the Bench, Preferring Instead to 
Defer to the Official Rulemaking Process, Justice Kennedy Has 
Endorsed the Possibility of a Heightened Standard in the Context of 
a Qualified Immunity Defense 
Since 1988, the Supreme Court has had the authority to prescribe 
general rules of federal practice and procedure, so long as those rules do not 
―abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.‖164  This does not mean, 
however, that the Court has either the authority or the inclination to 
announce or change federal procedural rules from the bench, as doing so 
would comply neither with the mandates of the Rules Enabling Act165 nor 
 
 160. Id. at 94 . 
 161. Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 
(1957), as quoted in Twombly, for its construction of Rule 8(a)(2)). 
 162. Id. at 94. 
 163. Id.  
 164. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (enacted as part of the Judicial Improvements and Access to 
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988)).  The 1988 rule is essentially the same as 
the original 1934 Rules Enabling Act promulgation, which provided that ―the Supreme Court of 
the United States shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the 
United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, 
and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law.‖  Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 
1064 (1934).   
 165. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1015, 1024–27 (1982) (offering ―a general reinterpretation of the Act in light of the pre-1934 
history,‖ examining the implications of that interpretation and the adequacy of the Act in light of 
it, and proposing  procedural reform in the hopes of achieving ―a rational allocation of lawmaking 
power between the Supreme Court and Congress‖).  For a discussion of the respective rulemaking 
roles of the Court and Congress, see Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court’s Role in 
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1072 (1993).   
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with traditional notions of judicial authority.166  Therefore, the Court has 
consistently taken the position that procedural rules, especially those related 
to pleading, discovery, and summary judgment, should be amended through 
official rulemaking or legislative processes.167  
In Gomez v. Toledo,168 the Court unanimously declined to revise the 
pleading standard such that it would require plaintiffs to anticipate a 
qualified immunity defense.169  Similarly, in Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,170  the Court addressed the 
impropriety of judge-made amendments to Rule 8 and held that the Fifth 
Circuit, in requiring that a complaint contain factual specificity, had 
mistakenly implemented a judicially heightened pleading standard. 171  
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist suggested that if Rule 8 
were to be rewritten as a general matter, it might include a greater level of 
specificity regarding the requirements for Section 1983 municipal 
liability.172  He declined, however, to use the Court‘s authority to require 
such specificity, on the grounds that a procedural shift as significant as a 
heightened pleading standard should derive from amendments to the 
Federal Rules and not from judicial interpretation.173   
Citing Gomez and Leatherman, the Court in Crawford-El v. Britton 
affirmed its reluctance to engage in judicial legislation by changing the 
Federal Rules outside of the official rulemaking process.174  In Crawford-
El, the divided D.C. Circuit had concluded, first, that independent 
government officials facing constitutional torts are entitled to pre-discovery 
summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity—including the 
question of the officer‘s mental state, if applicable—and second, that a 
 
 166. Cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594 (1998) (―[T]o change the burden of proof 
for an entire category of claims would stray far from the traditional limits on judicial authority.‖). 
 167. Id. at 595 (explaining that the Court has consistently and unanimously refused to engage 
in judicial legislation to revise established procedural rules separate from the qualified immunity 
defense); see also id. at 610 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (―[W]hether a defendant is entitled to 
protection against the ‗peculiarly disruptive‘ inquiry into subjective intent should not depend on 
the willingness or ability of a particular district court judge to limit inquiry through creative 
application of the Federal Rules.‖). 
 168. 446 U.S. 635 (1980). 
 169. Id. at 640. 
 170. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).   
 171. Id. at 167–69. 
 172. Id. at 168. 
 173. Id.; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514–15 (2002) (―Whatever the 
practical merits of this argument, the Federal Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard 
for employment discrimination suits.  A requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is 
a result that [requires legislative, not judicial, action].‖). 
 174. 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (citing Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 164–69; Gomez, 446 U.S. at 
639–40).  
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plaintiff must produce clear and convincing evidence of the officer‘s 
improper motive to defeat a motion for summary judgment or directed 
verdict.175  In rejecting both conclusions,176 Justice Stevens conceded that a 
judge ―may insist that the plaintiff ‗put forward specific, nonconclusory 
factual allegations‘ that establish improper motive causing cognizable 
injury in order to survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary 
judgment,‖ regardless of whether the case includes an immunity defense.177  
However, he also reiterated the Court‘s unanimous reluctance to resolve 
questions about procedural standards other than through the rulemaking or 
legislative processes, thereby distinguishing between a court‘s discretion in 
individual case management and a court‘s ability to change procedural rules 
as a general matter.178  
In line with the Court‘s view, Justice Kennedy has asserted that the 
authority to propose far-reaching procedural changes, even as a means of 
advancing the Court‘s long-standing goal of shielding governmental 
officials from trial and discovery, lies with Congress and not with the 
judiciary.179  In Siegert v. Gilley,180 however, a Bivens case in which a 
government employee alleged that his former supervisor had violated his 
Fifth Amendment due process rights, Justice Kennedy advocated for a 
heightened pleading standard in defamation cases against government 
officials. 181   Such a standard, he reasoned, would resolve the tension 
between the subjective element required to prove actual malice with respect 
to the underlying substantive claim and the objective element involved in 
the threshold question of qualified immunity.182  Moreover, a heightened 
 
 175. Id. at 583.  A motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss are different 
procedural tools with differing standards of review; motions for summary judgment are governed 
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.  A pre-discovery motion for summary judgment, however, 
is nearly the same as a pre-discovery motion to dismiss with respect to the issues relevant to this 
Note‘s discussion of Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 
 176. First, Justice Stevens concluded that Harlow v. Fitzgerald, which eradicated the need to 
prove unlawful intent with respect to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, did not 
support the D.C. Circuit‘s conclusion that the need to prove unlawful intent was also unnecessary 
for the underlying constitutional violation.  Id. at 589.  Second, he concluded that the lower 
court‘s imposition of a heightened standard on the merits was at odds with the Court‘s consistent 
hesitation to revise established rules independent of the immunity defense, id. at 594–95, and with 
―traditional limits on judicial authority,‖ id. at 594.     
 177. Id. at 598 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
the judgment)).  
 178. Id. at 595. 
 179. See, e.g., id. at 601 (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf. Siegert, 500 U.S at 235 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that in light of the differences of opinion between the 
majority and dissent, ―it is unwise to resolve [the issue of whether a liberty interest exists] without 
the benefit of a decision by the Court of Appeals and full briefing and argument here‖). 
 180. 500 U.S. 226. 
 181. Id. at 235–36 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 182. Id. 
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standard would better serve a fundamental purpose of the official immunity 
doctrine—to avoid disruptive discovery.183  Justice Kennedy did not have 
the votes for such a standard, however, and the Court held that the 
plaintiff‘s complaint could not withstand dismissal because it had failed to 
satisfy the threshold requirement of alleging the violation of a clearly 
established constitutional right.184 
E.  Qualified Immunity: A Compromise Between Countervailing 
Concerns 
Government officials facing personal liability for objectively 
discernable constitutional violations committed in the course of performing 
discretionary functions of their office are entitled to assert an affirmative 
defense of qualified immunity,185 or, as the Supreme Court now prefers to 
call it, immunity from suit. 186   In cases where the defense applies, a 
plaintiff‘s claim may only be legally cognizable if it alleges personal 
involvement on the part of the government official.187  The Supreme Court 
has found that judicial inquiry is appropriate, therefore, when a plaintiff‘s 
complaint makes a ―substantial showing‖ that a specific government 
official was responsible for wielding governmental authority to impinge on 
that plaintiff‘s private, constitutional rights.188  Until Iqbal‘s case reached 
 
 183. Id. (―[I]t is no answer to say that the plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity to engage in 
discovery.  The substantive defense of immunity controls.‖).  
 184. Id. at 231 (majority opinion). 
 185. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (―[T]his Court has never indicated 
that qualified immunity is relevant to the existence of the plaintiff‘s cause of action; instead we 
have described it as a defense available to the official in question.‖).  For an explanation of the 
qualified immunity defense, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982), which held 
that government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded by immunity so long as 
they have not ―violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.‖  Harlow discarded the subjective element required for 
qualified immunity under Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), which had refused to 
immunize school officials who committed unlawful acts with the subjective intent to do so.  Id. at 
322.  In Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998), the Court clarified that under the Harlow 
standard, a qualified immunity defense could not be rebutted by evidence that the government 
official‘s conduct was malicious or otherwise improperly motivated, because evidence related to 
the officer‘s subjective intent is ―simply irrelevant to that defense.‖  Id. at 587–88; see also 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (establishing that qualified immunity is assessed under a standard of 
objective reasonableness).   
 186. The Court first began referring to qualified immunity as ―immunity from suit,‖ rather than 
as a ―mere defense to liability,‖ in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).  For a list of 
―thoughtful‖ scholarly articles on qualified immunity, see Alan K. Chen, The Facts About 
Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 235 n.29 (2006). 
 187. Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining 
that the determination whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity is a purely 
legal question); see also Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640 (asserting that because qualified immunity is a 
defense, ―the burden of pleading it rests with the defendant‖).  
 188. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 398 (1932).   
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the Supreme Court, personal involvement of a supervisory official could be 
established in the Second Circuit189 if the official (1) directly participated 
in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) failed to remedy a wrong after 
learning of it through a report or appeal, (3) created or allowed an 
unconstitutional policy or custom, (4) was grossly negligent in supervising 
subordinates who actually committed the wrongful acts, or (5) failed to act 
on information regarding an unconstitutional act when such failure 
displayed a deliberate indifference to the rights of others.190  The Second 
Circuit had further clarified that personal involvement did not necessitate a 
government official‘s direct participation in a constitutional violation.191  
In Saucier v. Katz,192 the Court developed a sequential two-part test 
for determining whether an individual government officer is entitled to 
qualified immunity in a Section 1983 or Bivens action.193  First, a court 
must ascertain whether the pleaded facts sufficiently allege the violation of 
a constitutional right.194  If so, then the court must determine whether that 
right was ―clearly established‖ at the time of the defendant‘s alleged 
wrongdoing.195  Recently, the Court receded from the required order of the 
test, holding that courts may still follow the Saucier sequence, but now 
have the discretion to deviate from it in cases where to do so would be more 
efficient or where judicial restraint calls for avoiding a constitutional 
question that can be resolved on alternate grounds.196  
Despite the frequency with which the immunity defense is evoked, 
Judge Wilson of the Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged that ―[w]ading 
through the doctrine of qualified immunity is one of the most morally and 
conceptually challenging tasks federal appellate court judges routinely 
face.‖ 197   Underlying the qualified immunity doctrine is the implicit 
assumption that not only are government officials capable of error, but the 
possibility of injury resulting from such error is outweighed by the 
possibility that fear of liability could lead government officials not to act at 
all.198  In Pearson, the Court noted that the ―driving force‖ behind the 
 
 189. Iqbal‘s case fell under the Second Circuit‘s jurisdiction.  See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 
(2d Cir. 2007).  
 190. Johnson, 239 F.3d at 254.  
 191. Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 855 F.2d 1060, 1066 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 192. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 193. Id. at 200–01. 
 194. Id.   
 195. Id. 
 196. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (―[W]hile the sequence set forth [in 
Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.‖). 
 197. Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the 
Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447 (2000). 
 198. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974). 
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creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was the goal of ensuring that 
unmeritorious claims against government officials would be resolved before 
the case reached discovery, thereby preventing the official from being 
distracted from official duties and decreasing significant exertions of time 
and expense during the pre-trial process. 199   The reason for treating 
immunity as a threshold issue, therefore, is not only to spare government 
defendants from unwarranted liability, but also to shield them from the 
―unwarranted demands‖ of a traditional and prolonged lawsuit. 200   In 
Crawford-El v. Britton, the Court acknowledged that the usual concerns 
about social costs associated with subjecting public officials to discovery 
and trial are especially acute in the context of claims that turn on improper 
intent.201  
Even so, as Justice Powell explained in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, ―[t]he 
resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the 
evils inevitable in any available alternative.‖202  Therefore, the Court has 
often asserted that limited discovery is sometimes necessary before a 
district court can resolve a motion for summary judgment regarding 
qualified immunity.203  In the case of a government official who has abused 
his or her official office, though, imposition of liability may afford the only 
realistic means of vindicating the aggrieved party‘s constitutional rights.204  
Moreover, the threat of such abuse is even more acute with respect to high-
level officials, whose greater power increases the potential for both 
individual abuse of office and ―a regime of lawless conduct.‖205 
III.  THE COURT‘S REASONING 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 206  the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit, remanded the case,207 and 
 
 199. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987)).   
 200. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). 
 201. 523 U.S. 574, 584–85 (1998) (―Because an official‘s state of mind is ‗easy to allege and 
hard to disprove,‘ insubstantial claims that turn on improper intent may be less amenable to 
summary disposition than other types of claims against government officials.‖). 
 202. 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982).  
 203. See, e.g., id. at 820–21 (Brennan, J., concurring) (agreeing with the substantive standard 
for qualified immunity set forth by the majority but suggesting also that ―it seems inescapable . . . 
that some measure of discovery may sometimes be required to determine exactly what a public-
official defendant did ‗know‘ at the time of his actions‖); see also Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 593 
n.14 (acknowledging that the Court has ―recognized that limited discovery may sometimes be 
necessary before the district court can resolve a motion for summary judgment based on qualified 
immunity‖). 
 204. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (majority opinion). 
 205. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505–06 (1978).   
 206. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
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held that respondent Iqbal failed to plead sufficient factual allegations to 
withstand petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller‘s pre-discovery motion to 
dismiss the complaint‘s First and Fifth Amendment claims of unlawful 
discrimination.208  In so holding, the Court concluded first that because 
there is no vicarious liability in Section 1983 and Bivens actions,209 such 
that each defendant may only be held liable for his own unlawful acts,210 a 
plaintiff seeking to impose supervisory liability on a government official for 
racial discrimination must plead and prove that the official acted with a 
discriminatory purpose.211   Second, the Court extended the plausibility 
standard governing the relationship between Rule 8 pleading requirements 
and Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss that was announced in Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly212 to all civil actions.213  Because the factual assertions 
in Iqbal‘s complaint did not give rise to a plausible inference of petitioners‘ 
discriminatory states of mind, the Court held that his allegations against 
Ashcroft and Mueller failed to satisfy the applicable standard under 
Twombly.214   
Writing for a majority of five,215 Justice Kennedy circumscribed the 
two questions presented by the petitioners into a single, broad issue: 
Whether Iqbal had pled sufficient facts to state a claim that petitioners had 
violated his clearly established constitutional rights.216   The Court first 
discussed the legal doctrines for the underlying substantive claims, then 
addressed the proper pleading standard under Twombly and Rule 8, finally 
applying that standard to Iqbal‘s complaint.217   
 
 207. The Supreme Court instructed the court of appeals to decide whether to remand the case 
to the district court regarding whether Iqbal should be granted leave to amend his complaint.  Id. 
at 1954. 
 208. Id.  Although the original action named more than thirty defendants, the only two 
defendants who petitioned for certiorari were John Ashcroft, the former U.S. Attorney General, 
and Robert Mueller, then-Director of the FBI.  Id. at 1942.  
 209. Id. at 1948.  A Bivens action is the federal equivalent of a § 1983 action against state 
officials.  Id.  
 210. Id. at 1949. 
 211. Id. at 1948. 
 212. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 213. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953. 
 214. Id. at 1952 (citing and construing FED. R. CIV. P. 8). 
 215. Id. at 1941 (including Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito).   
 216. Id. at 1942–43.  Opening the opinion with a brief overview of the historical context giving 
rise to Iqbal‘s grievances, Justice Kennedy explained that the Department of Justice launched a 
vast investigation of suspected terrorists in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, 
attacks.  Id. at 1943.  He next clarified that Iqbal‘s constitutional challenge centered on the 
conditions of his confinement rather than on the confinement itself or on his arrest.  Id. at 1943–
44.  Because only Ashcroft and Mueller had sought Supreme Court review, the only relevant 
allegations were those against the executive level officials.  Id. at 1944. 
 217. Id. at 1947–51.  
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In determining the elements of the underlying legal claims, the Court 
first considered the level of intent required for an unconstitutional 
discrimination claim against government officials asserting a qualified 
immunity defense.218  Because the alleged conduct giving rise to Iqbal‘s 
claims was primarily that of lower-level federal employees and because 
petitioners were two high-level government officials, the Court framed its 
brief discussion of intent in terms of supervisory liability. 219   Neither 
respondeat superior nor vicarious liability, Justice Kennedy concluded, are 
applicable in Bivens actions, 220  so a plaintiff must plead that each 
supervisory official has directly violated the Constitution through his or her 
own individual actions. 221   For First and Fifth Amendment Bivens 
violations alleging discrimination on the part of a supervisor, ―individual 
action‖ requires discriminatory purpose.222   
In designating purpose as the proper level of intent, the Court rejected 
Iqbal‘s argument that liability should attach when a supervisor with 
knowledge of a subordinate‘s purposively discriminatory conduct has 
acquiesced in or condoned that conduct.223  Because Bivens liability for 
unconstitutional discrimination requires discriminatory purpose on the part 
of a subordinate, the Court reasoned, the same standard of intent should 
also be required of supervisors. 224   Therefore, supervisory liability is 
actually a ―misnomer‖ in Bivens cases.225   
Before considering whether Iqbal had sufficiently alleged that 
Ashcroft and Mueller acted with discriminatory purpose, the Court first 
reiterated and extended its holding in Twombly to conclude that for all civil 
actions, only complaints that are facially plausible will survive a motion to 
dismiss. 226   Facial plausibility exists, the Court explained, when a 
complaint contains ―sufficient factual matter, accepted as true‖ to enable 
the court ―to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
the misconduct alleged.‖ 227   Justice Kennedy noted that although the 
Court‘s conception of plausibility does not reach the level of probability, it 
does envision ―more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
 
 218. Id. at 1948. 
 219. Id. at 1948–49. 
 220. Id. at 1948 (assuming without deciding that Iqbal‘s First Amendment claim was 
actionable under Bivens, the federal equivalent of a § 1983 suit against state officials). 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. at 1949. 
 224. Id.  
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. at 1949, 1953. 
 227. Id. at 1949. 
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unlawfully.‖228  In other words, plausibility demands factual allegations 
that are more than ―‗merely consistent with‘‖ a defendant‘s liability.229   
The standard in Twombly, the Court reasoned, was based on two 
working principles: First, whereas all factual allegations in a complaint 
must be accepted by the court as true, legal conclusions are entitled to no 
such presumption; second, a complaint must state a plausible claim for 
relief to survive dismissal.230  Accordingly, Justice Kennedy proposed a 
two-pronged approach for courts to employ in assessing a 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss: (1) identify those allegations in a complaint that are not factual 
and therefore not entitled to a presumption of truth, and (2) consider 
whether the remaining allegations, taken as true, state a plausible claim.231  
This assessment, the Court acknowledged, is ―a context-specific task that 
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 
sense.‖232 
Applying the two-step Twombly approach to Iqbal‘s complaint, the 
Court first identified three ―bare assertions‖ that, while not ―unrealistic or 
nonsensical,‖ were so ―conclusory‖ that the Court could not presume them 
to be true.233  Turning to the remaining allegations,234 Justice Kennedy 
then applied the test‘s second prong to conclude that a more likely 
explanation for Iqbal‘s classification as ―of high interest‖ was a legitimate 
post-September 11th policy intended to arrest and detain illegal aliens with 
suspected links to the terrorist attacks.235  Because the hijackers were Arab 
Muslims, Justice Kennedy reasoned, it ―should come as no surprise‖ that 
the policy resulted in a ―disparate, incidental impact‖ on individuals of such 
race, religion, and national origin. 236   Given this ―‗obvious alternative 
 
 228. Id.  
 229. Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 500 U.S. 554, 557 (2007)). 
 230. Id. at 1949–50. 
 231. Id. at 1950. 
 232. Id.  
 233. Id. at 1951.  Specifically, Justice Kennedy construed the following assertions as too 
conclusory: (1) that Ashcroft and Mueller ―knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously 
agreed to subject‖ Iqbal to egregious conditions of confinement at the ADMAX SHU ―as a matter 
of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate 
penological interest,‖ (2) that Ashcroft was ―the principal architect‖ of the discriminatory policy, 
and (3) that Mueller was ―instrumental‖ in accepting and implementing it.  Id.  
 234. Although the complaint set forth 270 individual claims, the Court noted only two in its 
plausibility assessment.  First, that in the months after September 11, 2001, the FBI, ―under the 
direction of Defendant Mueller, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part 
of its investigation of the events of September 11.‖  Id.  Second, that ―[t]he policy of holding post-
September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‗cleared‘ 
by the FBI was approved by Defendants Ashcroft and Mueller in discussions in the weeks after 
September 11, 2001.‖  Id.  
 235. Id.  
 236. Id.  
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explanation,‘‖237 the Court determined that it was not plausible to conclude 
that Iqbal‘s arrest was a result of purposeful discrimination.238  
Moreover, even if such an inference were plausible as to Iqbal‘s 
arrest, the allegations did not lead to the plausible inference that his 
classification as ―of high interest‖ was based on a policy that categorized 
post-September 11th detainees based on their race, religion, or national 
origin. 239   Reasoning that Iqbal‘s allegations failed to ―show, or even 
intimate‖ that Ashcroft and Mueller had detained Iqbal and others in the 
ADMAX SHU with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, 
or national origin, the Court noted that the complaint merely suggested that 
Ashcroft and Mueller had adopted and approved a policy of holding post-
September 11th detainees in restrictive conditions.240  This policy, Justice 
Kennedy concluded, could only lead to the plausible inference that the 
high-level officials had responded to ―a devastating terrorist attack‖ by 
seeking to keep individuals who were detained because of a suspected link 
to the attack in the most secure conditions possible. 241   Without more 
specific facts indicating petitioners‘ intent, Iqbal‘s allegation of purposeful 
discrimination did not state a claim that entitled him to relief.242   
Addressing in conclusion three of Iqbal‘s arguments, the Court made 
clear that (1) Twombly‘s plausibility standard applies broadly to ―‗all civil 
actions,‘‖243  (2) the ―careful-case-management approach‖ to controlling 
discovery could not save an implausible complaint from dismissal,244 and 
(3) bare assertions ―affix[ed with] the label ‗general allegation‘‖ are the 
very type of conclusory claims that, without further factual enhancement, 
are inherently unable to support a plausible inference of liability.245   
Joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, Justice Souter 
dissented from the Court‘s opinion, reasoning that it unnecessarily 
eradicated supervisory liability under Bivens and misapplied the correct 
pleading standard announced in Twombly to mistakenly hold that Iqbal‘s 
 
 237. Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)).  
 238. Id. at 1951–52. 
 239. Id. at 1952. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id.  
 242. Id.  
 243. Id. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).   
 244. Id. at 1953–54 (noting that rejecting a less ―relax[ed]‖ pleading standard despite 
discovery controls is ―especially important‖ in the context of cases against government officials 
entitled to a qualified immunity defense). 
 245. Id. at 1954 (rejecting Iqbal‘s contention that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 ―expressly 
allow[s]‖ for a general assertion of discriminatory intent, because ―‗generally‘ is a relative term‖ 
whose specific meaning in the context of Rule 9 is inapplicable here). 
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complaint failed to state a claim under Rule 8(a)(2).246  First, Justice Souter 
recited a number of assertions contained in Iqbal‘s complaint, including 
allegations against defendants not before the Court.247   He then parsed 
through the two questions contained in Ashcroft and Mueller‘s petition for 
certiorari, explaining that while both questions assumed that supervisory 
liability claims are actionable under Bivens, neither asked the Court to 
assess the elements of such a claim. 248   Because the standard for 
supervisory liability was not only undisputed, but specifically agreed upon 
by the parties,249 Justice Souter reasoned that the Court erred in ruling on 
the substantive standard sua sponte.250  The Court‘s ruling, Justice Souter 
contended, was ―especially inappropriate‖ in this case because such a ruling 
was, even according to the Court‘s own analysis, unnecessary to decide the 
questions presented.251  Noting that ―a spectrum of possible tests‖ exists for 
supervisory liability, Justice Souter argued that the majority‘s assumption 
that such liability could exist only under a theory of respondeat superior or 
not at all was a false dichotomy that exemplified the danger of issuing far-
reaching decisions without briefing, argument, or any real depth of 
analysis.252 
Second, Justice Souter clarified that his analysis of Iqbal‘s complaint 
differed from the majority‘s not because he disagreed that Twombly‘s 
plausibility standard should apply or because he took issue with that 
 
 246. Id. at 1954–55 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading for relief 
contain ―a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.‖  
FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 247. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1955.  
 248. Id. at 1955–56.  The two questions were as follows: (1) ―Whether a conclusory allegation 
that a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a 
plaintiff to allegedly unconstitutional acts purportedly committed by subordinate officials is 
sufficient to state individual-capacity claims against those officials under Bivens‖; and (2) 
―Whether a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official may be held personally liable for 
the allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as high-level 
supervisors, they had constructive notice of the discrimination allegedly carried out by such 
subordinate officials.‖  Id.  
 249. Ashcroft and Mueller conceded that knowledge of their subordinate‘s unconstitutional 
acts coupled with their own ―deliberate[] indifferen[ce]‖ to those acts could subject them to 
supervisory liability under Bivens.  Id. at 1956. 
 250. Id. at 1956–57. 
 251. Id. at 1957.  Justice Souter explained that because the Court construed the allegation that 
Ashcroft and Mueller ―authorized, condoned, or even were aware of their subordinates‘ 
discriminatory conduct‖ as both conclusory and not entitled to the presumption of truth, the 
complaint would have been dismissed as implausible regardless of the liability standard.  Id. at 
1958.  In addition, Justice Souter opined that because the Court ruled on the supervisory liability 
issue without receiving any briefing or argument from the parties, ―[t]he attendant risk of error 
[was] palpable.‖  Id. at 1957.  Finally, Justice Souter declared that the ruling was ―most unfair to 
Iqbal,‖ who ―was entitled to rely on [petitioners‘] concessions.‖  Id. 
 252. Id. at 1958. 
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standard,253 but rather because he disagreed with the majority‘s application 
of it.254  
Specifically, he rejected the Court‘s contention that three particular 
allegations were too conclusory to be taken as true and offered a more 
contextualized, less stringent identification of the complaint‘s factual 
allegations.255  Agreeing that dismissal would have been proper if the only 
allegations in Iqbal‘s complaint entitled to a presumption of veracity were 
the two selected by the majority, Justice Souter went on to assert that ―these 
allegations do not stand alone as the only significant, nonconclusory 
statements.‖256  His disagreement with the majority‘s approach, therefore, 
was based on what he considered to be an improper interpretive approach of 
analyzing Iqbal‘s assertions in isolation, thereby disregarding certain 
―subsidiary allegations‖ that could have pushed those allegations 
disregarded by the Court as too conclusory into what Justice Souter 
considered factual assertions. 257   Implicitly rejecting the Court‘s two-
pronged approach to assessing plausibility, Justice Souter conversely 
endorsed a method of interpretation under which courts should consider the 
complaint ―as a whole.‖ 258  Under this approach, given petitioners‘ 
concession that knowledge and acquiescence could sufficiently support a 
supervisory liability claim, Iqbal‘s complaint was sufficiently plausible.259 
Justice Breyer wrote his own brief dissent to endorse the adequacy of 
careful discovery management and ―other legal weapons‖ that courts could 
use to prevent unwarranted litigation against government officials asserting 
a qualified immunity defense. 260   Although he joined Justice Souter‘s 
dissent—which approved of the Court‘s understanding of Twombly‘s 
plausibility standard—Justice Breyer did not agree that the need to prevent 
 
 253. Justice Souter actually announced this standard for the Court in Twombly.  Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly, 500 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).   
 254. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959. 
 255. Id. at 1959–60 (arguing that the allegation that Ashcroft was a ―principal architect‖ of the 
allegedly discriminatory policy and the claim that he and Mueller ―knew of, condoned, and 
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to [the harsh] conditions of confinement as a 
matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no 
legitimate penological interest‖ were factual, rather than conclusory); see supra note 233 and 
accompanying text (listing the three allegations identified as too conclusory by Justice Kennedy‘s 
majority opinion).  
 256. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960. 
 257. Id. at 1960–61 (noting also that ―the majority‘s holding that the statements it selects are 
conclusory cannot be squared with its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint as 
nonconclusory‖). 
 258. Id. at 1961. 
 259. Id. at 1958–59.   
 260. Id. at 1961–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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harmful discovery or litigation against government officials adequately 
justified the Court‘s interpretation of Twombly and Rule 8.261   
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Although Ashcroft v. Iqbal seemed to do little more than extend Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly‘s262 plausibility standard to all civil actions, its 
implications for pleading practice, court access, and the judicial role run 
much deeper.  In moving further from Conley v. Gibson‘s263 pro-plaintiff 
standard, the Court not only endorsed but seemingly encouraged an 
unprecedented level of judicial discretion in the lower courts with respect to 
pre-discovery motions to dismiss.264  This all but ensures a non-uniform, 
arbitrary procedural landscape across which certain defendants will no 
longer gain meaningful access to the federal courts.265  In departing from 
longstanding deference to the formal rulemaking process, the Court 
anticipated the same threat of judicial activism that the plausibility standard 
is likely to exacerbate.266  The standard itself is problematic insofar as it 
has raised the pleading bar, thereby departing from the vision of the drafters 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—to encourage resolution of cases 
on the merits.267   Moreover, it represents the quintessential procedural 
solution to a substantive dilemma. 268   The Court not only indirectly 
attacked the growing problem of outrageous discovery costs, but also 
granted de facto immunity to high-level government officials, thereby 
absolving them from culpability on the basis of a pleading standard that is 
patently unjust for plaintiffs incapable of pleading ―non-conclusory‖ facts 
before discovery.269  
A.  The Problem with Plausibility: Iqbal Shifted the Analysis for 
12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss from a Relatively Bright-Line Test to 
an Open Market on Judicial Subjectivity 
Although Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly270 had created considerable 
confusion in the lower federal courts,271 the Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal272 
 
 261. Id. at 1961. 
 262. 500 U.S. 554 (2007). 
 263. 355 U.S. 541 (1957). 
 264. See infra Part IV.A. 
 265. See infra Part IV.A. 
 266. See infra Part IV.B. 
 267. See infra Part IV.B. 
 268. See infra Part IV.C. 
 269. See infra Part IV.C. 
 270. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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did little to clarify the meaning of plausibility or suggest how judges might 
distinguish plausible inferences of liability from those that are probable, 
possible, or conceivable.273  Revealing only that the new standard applies 
to all civil actions, the Court limited its advice to a single, curious 
suggestion: Discerning plausibility is ―a context-specific task that requires 
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 
sense.‖ 274   As a result, the Court all but ensured that the contentious 
response to Twombly reflects merely the beginning of the difficulties that 
federal courts will continue to face as they develop understandings—and 
applications—of the flexible, discretionary directive that is plausibility.275  
Moreover, as one federal district judge has suggested, this evolution in the 
lower courts—an ―inherently subjective endeavor‖—will inevitably 
produce varied results, such as those regarding the quantum of facts 
required for a sufficient complaint.276   
The Court‘s explicit invitation of judicial discretion is problematic on 
the Court‘s own terms: Just as ―Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance . . . 
dismissals based on a judge‘s disbelief of a complaint‘s factual 
allegations,‖277 nor should Rule 8 encourage dismissals based on a judge‘s 
subjective disbelief that particular factual allegations could plausibly 
 
 271. See Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower 
Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 858 (2008) 
(suggesting that Twombly provided so little guidance that it threw the lower federal courts into 
―disarray‖ and led to ―every conceivable answer‖ regarding how broadly the decision should be 
applied).  See generally Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court 
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 876–77 (2009) (arguing that Twombly was a court access decision 
rather than a procedural decision, and suggesting that Twombly did not ―alter pleading rules in as 
drastic a way as many of its critics, and even some of its few defenders, suppose‖); Douglas G. 
Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1088 (2009) (defending the plausibility 
standard as one with ―fairly clear guidelines‖); Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will 
We “Notice” Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 893, 894 n.7 (2008) (listing scholarly 
articles discussing pleading standards after Twombly). 
 272. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).  
 273. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (―The issues raised 
by Twombly are not easily resolved, and likely will be a source of controversy for years to 
come.‖). 
 274. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 275. Compare McMahon, supra note 271, at 863–64 (pointing out the impossibility of a 
consistent approach to interpreting and applying ―plausibility‖ in the district courts), with Smith, 
supra note 271, at 1088–89 (arguing that a careful reading of Twombly ―provides fairly clear 
guidelines for courts assessing whether a complaint meets the requirements of Rule 8‖). 
 276. McMahon, supra note 271, at 869 (arguing that ―[t]he standard for pleading a claim must 
be clear, and it must be the same for everyone‖); see also Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could 
Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A10 (quoting Professor 
Stephen B. Burbank as saying that Iqbal ―‗is a blank check for federal judges to get rid of cases 
they disfavor‘‖). 
 277. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). 
2010] ASHCROFT v. IQBAL 103 
 
establish liability.278   When the Federal Rules were originally enacted, 
Judge Clark explained that a court‘s ability to dismiss a pleading summarily 
was confined to ―the clearest of cases.‖279  Conspicuously departing from 
and complicating that dictate by adding a subjective dimension to the 
analysis, the Court endorsed a standard that is not only incapable of 
uniformity, but that rejects, sub silentio, the careful vision of the Rules‘ 
drafters.280  
Comments from a number of Justices at the Iqbal oral argument 
underscore the difficulty of achieving consistency in the application of a 
discretionary standard.  Justice Souter admitted, for instance, that he found 
significant tension in Iqbal‘s allegations, 281  while Justice Scalia easily 
reduced the gist of the complaint to two basic possibilities: (1) a valid and 
lawful post-September 11th policy, or (2) the ―much less plausible‖ 
possibility that Ashcroft and Mueller personally directed unconstitutional 
and unlawful acts.282  Eclipsing plausibility entirely, Justice Scalia went so 
far as to pronounce the complaint‘s allegation that Iqbal and others 
similarly situated were detained solely because of their race, religion, and 
national origin ―impossible.‖283  Writ large in this assertion is the troubling 
insinuation that no amount of factual allegations could have satisfied Justice 
Scalia‘s version of plausibility given the particular factual context of Iqbal‘s 
claims.  For him, the very premise of those claims—that high-level 
government officials were even capable of participating in a discriminatory 
policy—is simply not possible.284   
 
 278. Cf. Saritha Komatireddy Tice, A “Plausible” Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 827, 830 (2008) 
(noting that while offering little guidance to lower courts and plaintiffs with respect to the precise 
meaning of plausibility, Twombly ―reflects a significant shift away from the litigation-promoting 
mindset embodied in Conley and instead solidifies what has been a growing hostility toward 
litigation‖). 
 279. Clark, supra note 77, at 465 (citing Worthington & Co. v. Belton, 18 T.L.R. 438 (Eng. 
C.A. 1902)).  Judge Clark also asserted that cases warranting such dismissal ―are the great 
exceptions, not the rule.‖  Id. at 472. 
 280. See, e.g., id. at 467 (asserting the desirability of ―a system of procedure which will 
substantially eliminate motion practice dealing with pleading forms and force adjudication upon 
the merits, either by way of summary judgment or trial‖). 
 281. Transcript of Oral Argument at *9, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2008) (No. 07-
1015), 2008 WL 5168391. 
 282. Id. at *32–33.  Also noteworthy is the way in which Justice Scalia framed the two 
alternatives, using the term ―policy‖ only for the possibility that was, for him, obviously more 
plausible.  The textualist‘s language belies that Ashcroft and Mueller‘s culpability is so far from 
the realm of possibility for Justice Scalia that he cannot even bring himself to use the same 
language to describe it.    
 283. Id. at *54–55. 
 284. Also concerning is Justice Scalia‘s obfuscation of the long-standing principle that 
―[s]tandards of pleadings are not the same as standards of proof.‖  Phillips v. County of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 246 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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Dissenting in Twombly, Justice Stevens suggested that the Court‘s 
decision in that case was driven by a ―transparent policy concern‖—
protecting antitrust defendants.285  The decision in Iqbal is susceptible to 
the same criticism of a subjective judicial agenda.286  More disquieting than 
the way Supreme Court Justices deploy their personal understandings of 
abstract terms like ―plausible‖ in specific cases, though, are the broader 
institutional consequences that may follow from the Court‘s approbation 
and infliction of this method of procedural adjudication on the systemic 
level.287   
Like those of his colleagues, Justice Alito‘s remarks at oral argument 
also highlight, somewhat ironically, just how problematic a discretionary 
standard can be.  Rejecting the notion that a district court judge could use 
his or her discretion to limit and structure discovery to adequately protect 
high-level government officials who fail to attain dismissal on qualified 
immunity grounds, Justice Alito asked, ―How many district judges are there 
in the country?  Over 600.  One of the district judges has a very aggressive 
idea about what the discovery should be.  What‘s the protection there?‖288  
The Justice‘s question could just as easily refer to the lack of protection 
plaintiffs‘ complaints will receive under a plausibility standard. 289   In 
implying that high-level government officials who have tried—and failed—
to obtain qualified immunity at the 12(b)(6) stage should nonetheless be 
shielded from discovery, Justice Alito ironically undermined the very 
 
 285. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 596 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 286. McMahon, supra note 271, at 863–64 (calling plausibility assessments ―inherently 
subjective‖).  
 287. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 
527, 535 (1947) (―[T]he only sure safeguard against crossing the line between adjudication and 
legislation is an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained, 
reluctance to do so.‖).  This criticism is applicable to Iqbal on two different levels.  First, the 
Court itself employed a subjective policy judgment unmoored to precedent (other than Twombly 
and its nascent progeny) in determining that the best way to resolve the case and controversy 
before it was to amend, rather than apply, Rule 8.  Second, in so amending, the Court opened the 
door to potentially limitless judicial subjectivity from the lower federal courts, which must use 
their ―judicial experience and common sense‖ in determining whether civil complaints subject to 
12(b)(6) motions are plausible enough to withstand dismissal.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.     
 288. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 281, at *48. 
 289. For a particularly germane example of the possible divergence in federal appellate judges‘ 
understanding of plausibility, compare al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009)  
(―Drawing on our ‗judicial experience and common sense,‘ as the Supreme Court urges us to do, 
we find that al-Kidd has met his burden of pleading a claim for relief that is plausible . . . .‖), with 
id. at 992–94 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing, on the grounds of 
Twombly and Iqbal, that ―[i]t may be conceivable to al-Kidd that Ashcroft encouraged his 
subordinates to flout the requirements of § 3144, but al-Kidd‘s allegations have not ‗nudged [his] 
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible‘‖). 
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premise supporting the plausibility standard he later voted for—faith in 
judicial discretion.290  
Just as a plausibility standard raises serious concerns about the judicial 
role, it also raises serious concerns about a judicially-driven (d)evolution of 
the law of federal civil procedure; rather than moving the law forward, 
Twombly and Iqbal signal a return to the fact-based pleading system that 
has already been rejected as historically unjust and effectively 
unworkable.291  Though the Court in Iqbal paid lip-service to the long-dead 
days of fact pleading under the Codes, its language in asserting the 
inadequacy of facts ―merely consistent with‖ the defendant‘s liability 
masked a covert mandate of increased factual specificity. 292   The 
imposition of such a mandate suggests that the Court clearly ignored the 
fact that plaintiffs in 2009 are in no better a position to distinguish between 
facts and conclusions than were plaintiffs in 1959.293   
Moreover, the Court‘s insistence on a bright line between facts and 
legal conclusions294 raises the question whether Iqbal signifies a departure 
from the Court‘s long-standing position that ―ordinary pleading rules are 
not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff.‖295  Plaintiffs relying 
on Form 9 in the appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,296 for 
instance, will no longer receive meaningful assistance from a template that 
 
 290. A certain level of discretion, it is worth noting, has always been part of a court‘s 
assessment under the qualified immunity doctrine.  See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 
(1978) (―Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities 
of artful pleading.‖). 
 291. See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 271, at 867 (noting that the drafters of Rule 8 specifically 
rejected a conception of the Rule that would require pleading facts). 
 292. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (affirming that ―Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure 
from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of 
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions‖). 
 293. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 59, § 1218, at 265 (asserting the practical 
impossibility of distinguishing between ―ultimate facts,‖ which were required, and ―evidence‖ and 
―conclusions of law,‖ which were improper, and explaining that the three categories ―tended to 
merge to form a continuum‖ with ―no readily apparent dividing markers‖); Weinstein & Distler, 
supra note 115, at 520–21 (―[I]t is virtually impossible logically to distinguish among ‗ultimate 
facts,‘ ‗evidence,‘ and ‗conclusions.‘‖).  
 294. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (―[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.  Threadbare recitals of 
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.‖). 
 295. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (conceding that ―ordinary 
pleading rules are not meant to impose a great burden upon a plaintiff‖ and suggesting that ―it 
should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss to provide a 
defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in 
mind‖ (emphasis added)).  After Iqbal, this burden of giving defendant ―some indication‖ of loss 
and cause has effectually evolved into the burden of giving enough facts to convince the particular 
judge hearing the case that liability is plausible. 
 296. Form 9 in the appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a sample complaint 
form for a simple negligence action.  FED. R. CIV. P. app., Form 9.  
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provides defendants being sued for negligence with what can only be 
construed under the plausibility standard as a bare, conclusory allegation 
that ―defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was 
then crossing [the] highway.‖297  Another way of framing this inequity for 
plaintiffs is in terms of ―information asymmetry.‖ 298   Such asymmetry 
occurs when, paradoxically, plaintiffs with bona fide grievances are at once 
unable to include sufficient facts in an original complaint without first 
investigating the source of those facts through discovery and also blocked 
from discovery because of their inability to plead the very facts that only 
discovery can yield.299  
B.  Amending Rule 8 by Judicial Fiat: Purporting Simply to Extend 
Twombly’s Plausibility Standard, the Court Actually Effectuated 
More Significant Changes in Federal Procedure Jurisprudence 
That the Court has often declined to amend the Federal Rules from the 
bench reflects distaste for judicial activism in the context of establishing 
and re-writing procedural rules.300  Justice Kennedy‘s reluctance to revise 
 
 297. Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. 
IN BRIEF 135, 141 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s 
=inbrief&p=2007/07/09/dodson.  The possible inutility of the forms after Twombly and Iqbal 
represents a significant departure from Conley‘s assertion that the ―illustrative forms appended to 
the Rules‖ demonstrate that a complaint need only give the defendant fair notice of the claim and 
its grounds.  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).  It also undermines Judge Clark‘s vision 
that the relatively un-detailed information contained in Form 9 clearly ―affords adequate basis for 
res judicata,‖ Clark, supra note 77, at 461–62, in seeking to accomplish the twin goals of 
differentiating the plaintiff‘s case from all others and giving the defendant notice of the general 
type of claims being advanced, id. at 456–57.   
 298. Dodson, supra note 297, at 138–39 & n.18 (borrowing the term ―information asymmetry‖ 
from Professor Randy Picker and calling the plausibility standard ―notice-plus‖). 
 299. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980) (―The existence of a subjective belief 
will frequently turn on factors which a plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to know.‖); 
Dodson, supra note 297, at 138–39 (arguing that plaintiffs will have difficulty alleging sufficient 
facts with respect to claims where information is not in their control, such as in antitrust cases); 
McMahon, supra note 271, at 867 & n.114 (making the same argument and offering the example 
of employment discrimination claims); cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 590–91 (1998) 
(explaining that one reason Harlow abrogated the subjective element required for a qualified 
immunity defense is because ―focusing on ‗the objective legal reasonableness of an official‘s 
acts‘ . . . avoids the unfairness of imposing liability on a defendant who ‗could not reasonably be 
expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments‘‖ (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818–19 (1982))); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 245–46 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting the court of appeals‘s ―heightened pleading standard‖ and reasoning that because 
―evidence of [malice] is peculiarly within the control of the defendant,‖ the standard ―effectively 
precludes any Bivens action in which the defendant‘s state of mind is an element of the underlying 
claim‖). 
 300. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–73 (1965) (suggesting that ―‗the administration of 
legal proceedings‘‖ is ―‗an area in which federal courts have traditionally exerted strong inherent 
power, completely aside from the powers Congress expressly conferred in the Rules‘‖ (quoting 
Lumbermen‘s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963))).  But see Tellabs, Inc. 
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pleading standards by judicial fiat in Crawford-El v. Britton,301 therefore, 
was more likely a function of disdain for judicial intervention in the 
procedural arena than uncertainty as to the substantive merits of an 
amended standard.302   Given his affirmative argument for a heightened 
standard in Siegert v. Gilley,303 it is not surprising that Justice Kennedy was 
willing to vote in favor of extending Twombly to all civil cases in Iqbal and 
further to author the opinion himself—potential accusations of judicial 
activism notwithstanding.304  
Admittedly, Justice Kennedy‘s analyses in Siegert—a defamation case 
in which the immunity issue was whether the plaintiff had demonstrated a 
clearly established liberty interest—and Iqbal—in which the Court did not 
address the immunity issue directly—necessarily differed. 305   Justice 
Kennedy‘s proposal of a heightened pleading standard in Siegert signifies 
that he strongly champions governmental immunity as a general matter and 
is not opposed to some judicial intervention into the realm of procedure 
where countervailing concerns, such as the need to protect high-level 
officials from the intrusions of discovery, outweigh his reluctance to bypass 
the formal rulemaking process.306  What significantly distinguishes Siegert 
 
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 332 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(asserting that courts must interpret statutes according to their single most plausible meaning, 
suggesting that ―[t]o describe this as an exercise of ‗delegated lawmaking authority‘ seems to me 
peculiar—unless one believes in lawmakers who have no discretion,‖ and adding that ―[c]ourts 
must apply judgment, to be sure[, b]ut judgment is not discretion‖). 
 301. 523 U.S. at 601 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 302. One reason the Court may disfavor amending procedural rules may be a recognition that 
the Justices are ill-equipped to engage in such rulemaking, given their distance from the daily 
realities of litigation.  McMahon, supra note 271, at 869.  Moreover, none of the Iqbal Justices 
ever sat on a federal district bench, though Justice Souter was a state court trial judge.  See id. at 
869 & n.122 (suggesting that the Justices‘ lack of experience as trial lawyers or judges may be 
responsible for ―problematic decisions like Twombly‖ and opining that Justice Souter‘s experience 
as a trial judge makes his authorship of Twombly ―utterly mystifying‖).  Nothing underscores the 
Court‘s lack of familiarity with the minutiae of the Federal Rules more starkly than one of Justice 
Breyer‘s comments at the Iqbal oral argument: ―I want to know where the judge has the power to 
control discovery in the rules.  That‘s—I should know that.  I can‘t remember my civil procedure 
course. Probably, it was taught on day 4.‖  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 281, at *17.   
 303. 500 U.S. at 235–36 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra Part II.D. 
 304. See Liptak, supra note 276 (calling Iqbal ―[t]he most consequential decision of the 
Supreme Court‘s last term,‖ assuming that the decision ―makes it much easier for judges to 
dismiss civil lawsuits right after they are filed,‖ and suggesting that, after Iqbal, ―a lawsuit has to 
satisfy a skeptical judicial gatekeeper‖ with accusations that ―ring true‖).  
 305. Compare Siegert, 500 U.S. at 235–36 (―The heightened pleading standard is a necessary 
and appropriate accommodation between the state of mind component of malice and the objective 
test that prevails in qualified immunity analysis as a general matter.‖), with Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 
S. Ct. 1937, 1953–54 (2009) (declining to ―relax the pleading requirements‖ in qualified 
immunity cases such that limited discovery would be permitted under a ―careful-case-
management approach‖).   
 306. Given the choice between a departure from established procedural standards and the 
possibility of subjecting government officials to disruptive discovery absent immunity, Justice 
108 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 69:69 
 
from Iqbal, moreover, are the stakes of the two cases.  In the former, the 
Court considered and dismissed a defamation claim by a clinical 
psychologist employed by a federal government facility because the 
psychologist‘s complaint had not sufficiently alleged a constitutional 
violation.307  Iqbal, on the other hand, had potentially graver consequences, 
not only with respect to public sentiment regarding the Bush 
Administration‘s response to the September 11th attacks as a general 
matter, but also because the case came dangerously close to implicating 
men in the highest stations of federal government in the highest order of 
constitutional violations. 308   Moreover, Justice Stevens‘s assertion in 
Crawford-El that the Court has ―consistently declined . . . invitations to 
revise established rules that are separate from the qualified immunity 
defense,‖ 309  bolsters the likelihood that in Iqbal, the Court effectively 
sutured the pleading issue to the immunity defense.310   
At oral argument, Justice Kennedy made only four comments, all in 
close succession and all about the same issue.311  Addressing petitioners‘ 
counsel, Justice Kennedy asked, ―If we were to say that Twombly is to be 
confined to the antitrust and commercial context, would—would that 
destroy your case?‖ 312   In framing the question in terms of outcome, 
thereby linguistically subordinating legal doctrine to final disposition, 
Justice Kennedy‘s question reveals—in retrospect at least—that he may 
already have landed on what he believed to be the only plausible way to 
resolve the case without either exposing the high-level government officials 
to discovery or explicitly extending the qualified immunity doctrine.313  If 
so, then follows the disturbing question whether the Court‘s most 
significant player votes based on underlying substantive norms and 
 
Kennedy has asserted that ―[t]he substantive defense of immunity controls.‖  Siegert, 500 U.S. at 
236. 
 307. Id. at 227, 233–34 (majority opinion) (concluding that, under Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 
708–09 (1976), damage to reputation is not a liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and is not recoverable in a Bivens cause of action). 
 308. Because the standards for supervisory liability were unclear, however, Iqbal would not 
necessarily have been able to prove a clearly established constitutional violation even if his 
complaint had withstood dismissal.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948–49 (asserting that supervisory 
liability is a ―misnomer‖ and that because ―purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose 
Bivens liability on [a] subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination,‖ the same standard applies 
to ―an official charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities‖). 
 309. 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 310. See infra Part IV.C.  
 311. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 281, at *22–23. 
 312. Id. 
 313. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 235–36 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (reasoning that although a ―heightened pleading standard‖ represents a departure from 
usual pleading requirements, ―[t]he substantive defense of immunity controls‖). 
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ideology. 314   If not, it is unclear what else might account for Justice 
Kennedy‘s inconsistency in evoking the principle against judicial 
legislation in Crawford-El on one hand and conspicuously failing to do so 
in Siegert and Iqbal on the other.315  Although it could have been possible 
to resolve Iqbal on the basis of interlocutory jurisdiction, this would not 
necessarily have shielded Ashcroft and Mueller from ongoing litigation in 
the courts below.316  Therefore, Justice Kennedy extended Twombly to all 
civil actions.317 
In so doing, he exposed himself to the inevitable criticism of not only 
having amended Rule 8 from the bench, but having done so in such a way 
as to heighten the pleading standard. 318   According to the Court, a 
―heightened pleading standard‖ is one ―more stringent than the usual 
 
 314. Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A1 
(asserting that Chief Justice Roberts is orchestrating an incremental shift to the right, that Justice 
Kennedy tends to vote with Chief Justice Roberts, that Justice Kennedy is the Court‘s swing vote 
and the ―most powerful jurist in America,‖ and that the ―Constitution, it turns out, means what 
Justice Kennedy says it means‖).  If it is true that Justice Kennedy is drifting from his central 
position further to the right, this may account for his willingness to join his more conservative 
colleagues in using judicial activism qua rulemaking from the bench to expand governmental 
immunity and other principles according to Chief Justice Roberts‘s agenda.  Id. 
 315. Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York argues that federal judges have 
consistently ignored the design of the Federal Rules—which were intended to facilitate a 
smoother journey through confusing procedural obstacles, thereby encouraging courts to re-shift 
the litigation emphasis to the merits of a case—by resorting to an emphasis on procedural 
efficiency.  Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: 
Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 107–08 (2008) [hereinafter 
Weinstein, Role of Judges].  This is misguided, the Judge argues, not only because it has the effect 
of closing the proverbial courthouse doors to ―the weak and the aggrieved,‖ thus threatening the 
legitimacy of the judiciary, but also because it often leads to a denial of substantive rights absent 
procedural safeguards.  Id. at 107; see also Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1919–21 
(1989) (stating that the anti-access movement is objectionable because plaintiffs‘ substantive 
rights should not be denied through ―procedural subterfuge‖).  What this means, according to 
Judge Weinstein, is that the Court now so favors defendants, including the government, that the 
current pleading standards have closed off access to the courts, thereby deviating from President 
Lincoln‘s notion that government should exist ―for the people.‖  Weinstein, Role of Judges, supra, 
at 112.  The anti-access movement also ignores the Court‘s assertion that there is no immunity 
from all discovery.  Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593 n.14 (1998) (recognizing that 
―limited discovery may sometimes be necessary before the district court can resolve a motion for 
summary judgment based on qualified immunity‖). 
 316. In the Iqbal majority opinion, Justice Kennedy first resolved the threshold jurisdictional 
question before evaluating Iqbal‘s complaint.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (2009).  
He found that both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over petitioners‘ interlocutory appeal from the district court‘s rejection of qualified immunity at 
the motion to dismiss stage.  Id.  
 317. Id. at 1953. 
 318. E.g., al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009) (―Post-Twombly, plaintiffs 
face a higher burden of pleading facts, and courts face greater uncertainty in evaluating 
complaints.‖). 
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pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.‖319  In Twombly, the Court explicitly rejected the notion that it 
was raising the pleading standard.320  In changing the scope of the Twombly 
standard rather than its substance, Iqbal implicitly echoed this 
contention.321   Yet despite the Court‘s assertions to the contrary, both 
courts and commentators have suggested that the two decisions have 
imposed a more stringent pleading standard.322  More interesting than who 
is correct on this point—which will only be revealed over time as the lower 
federal courts apply the plausibility standard and the Twombly-Iqbal line 
evolves 323 —is the issue of judicial legislation in the realm of civil 
procedure and its implications for the judiciary, the Court, and the cases 
that have inspired the question.324  
C.  A Procedural Solution to a Substantive Problem: To the Extent that 
the Court in Iqbal “Fixed” Rule 8, It Was Not Because Rule 8 Itself 
Needed Fixing  
Javaid Iqbal did not likely file his complaint with an eye toward 
making legal history regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
though he may have hoped that factual history would vindicate his 
prolonged and depraved confinement without due process of law.  What 
Iqbal may not have anticipated was how two issues—the pleading standard 
and the qualified immunity doctrine evoked in response to his allegations 
against Ashcroft and Mueller—would come together in the perfect storm to 
 
 319. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
164 (1993). 
 320. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (―[W]e do not require 
heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim for relief that is 
plausible on its face.‖); cf. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (evoking the statutory construction canon 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the express mention of one thing excludes all others—to 
suggest that Rule 9(b)‘s factual particularity requirement for certain contexts implies that there is 
no such requirement generally under Rule 8). 
 321. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (explaining that ―[o]ur decision in Twombly expounded the 
pleading standard for ‗all civil actions‘‖).  Justice Kennedy did not explicitly address the question 
whether Iqbal raised the pleading standard, assumedly because the Court did so in Twombly.  To 
address the issue again where doing so was not necessary would have drawn unwanted attention 
to the also unacknowledged confusion in the lower courts over the meaning of plausibility.  
 322. See, e.g., Tice, supra note 278, at 827 (describing the Twombly standard as ―a broad 
decision that appears to tighten the reins on pleading standards‖).  For scholarly critiques of 
Twombly by federal judges suggesting that plausibility is a heightened standard, see Weinstein, 
Role of Judges, supra note 315, at 110–11, and McMahon, supra note at 271, at 863 (asserting 
that the Supreme Court‘s contention in Twombly that it was not imposing a heightened pleading 
standard was ―sheer sophistry,‖ but conceding that the Court had not intended to do away with 
notice pleading entirely). 
 323. Cf. Dodson, supra note 297, at 142 (suggesting that it will take years of increased 
litigation to determine what Twombly actually requires). 
 324. See infra Part IV.C. 
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which his grievances were ultimately sacrificed.  Petitioners‘ attorney, 
General Garre, framed the case in the opening sentence of his oral argument 
as one that ―concern[ed] the qualified immunity of high-ranking 
government officials like the Attorney General of the United States and 
Director of the FBI and supervisory liability claims under Bivens based on 
the alleged wrongdoing of much lower level officials.‖325  Later in his 
argument, General Garre reiterated that the case was primarily about 
qualified immunity, even as he urged the Court to formally extend Twombly 
beyond the antitrust context.326   In so doing, the General conflated the 
substantive issue of qualified immunity with the procedural issue of 
whether Iqbal‘s complaint sufficiently stated a claim for relief, thereby 
suggesting to the Court that one way—perhaps the only way—to ensure 
immunity for his clients would require a procedural resolution of the 
case.327   
To bolster this invitation to the Court, General Garre made two claims 
regarding the substantive standards of law germane to Iqbal‘s claims: First, 
he argued that Iqbal must plead an affirmative link between petitioners and 
the alleged wrongdoing of the lower-level officials, as required for 
supervisory liability under Bivens; second, he asserted that Ashcroft was 
―entitled to a presumption of regularity of his actions, so that—that 
standard itself ought to affect how one views the complaint.‖328  None of 
the Justices responded directly to this strange suggestion that a particular 
type of defendant—the U.S. Attorney General and others similarly 
situated—is somehow entitled to a ―standard‖ under which his actions are 
presumed to be consistent,329 but the Court‘s opinion silently echoes the 
sentiment.330 
 
 325. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 281, at *3.  
 326. Id. at *24.  
 327. General Garre argued: 
[R]eally we‘re here talking about claims against the highest-level officials of our 
government, who everyone agrees are entitled to the doctrine of qualified immunity, a 
doctrine that was designed, at the end of the day, to protect the effective functioning of 
our government. These officials are entitled at least to the protections that this Court 
found appropriate for civil antitrust defendants.  
Id. (emphasis added).  For a critique of the relationship between qualified immunity and pleading 
standards as articulated in petitioners‘ brief, see Brief of Professors of Civil Procedure & Fed. 
Practice, supra note 121, at 28 (arguing that petitioners‘ argument ―tacitly moves from the 
policies that animate qualified immunity to the standards of pleading‖ and criticizing the 
argument‘s reliance on ―the abstraction of qualified immunity‖ as ―a free-floating concept that 
permeates any case to which it might attach‖ such that ―the standards of pleading are virally 
infected by the concept‖).   
 328. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 281, at *57–58 (emphasis added). 
 329. General Garre seems to be suggesting that high-level government officials are 
automatically entitled to something like an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 404, which 
prohibits the admission of ―[e]vidence of a person‘s character or a trait of character . . . for the 
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In other words, although the Court never explicitly expressed a desire 
to immunize high-level government officials from liability for actions 
immediately following September 11th, the structure of Justice Kennedy‘s 
opinion suggests that the majority had an implicit intention of doing so.331  
First, after briefly outlining the case‘s question presented and stating the 
Court‘s disposition, Justice Kennedy began the opinion in full by offering a 
version of the relevant historical context unlike those that had appeared in 
the opinions of the courts below, pointedly citing factual material from a 
2003 Department of Justice study.332   From the outset, then, the Court 
signaled its intent to shroud the case in its own version of the aftermath of 
September 11th.333  That the Court did its own research is not in itself 
surprising or problematic.  But the fact that the Court cited research from 
the government—hardly an impartial party in a case where potential 
constitutional violations seriously implicated Bush Administration 
policies—coupled with the Court‘s conspicuous omission of details 
regarding Iqbal‘s individual allegations334 suggests that Justice Kennedy 
 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.‖  FED. R. EVID. 
404(a).  
 330.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951–52 (2009) (arguing that Iqbal‘s allegation that 
Ashcroft and Mueller had acted with discriminatory intent was not plausible, given the ―obvious 
alternative explanation‖ that the arrests overseen by the high-level officials were lawful and 
justified by the post-September 11th context); cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
573 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the insertion of plausibility into 12(b)(6) analysis 
―seems to be driven by the majority‘s appraisal of the plausibility of the ultimate factual allegation 
rather than its legal sufficiency‖). 
 331. Cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 612 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (proposing a 
qualified immunity test for intent-based constitutional torts under which ―once the trial court finds 
that the asserted grounds for the official action were objectively valid . . . it would not admit any 
proof that something other than those reasonable grounds was the genuine motive‖ and conceding 
that his proposal is ―of course a more severe restriction‖).  
 332. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943. 
 333. Id. (explaining that only one week after the attacks, ―the FBI had received more than 
96,000 tips or potential leads from the public‖ (citing U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS 
HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 
SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 1, 11–12 (2003), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf?bsci_scan_61073EC0F74759AD=0&bsci_scan_fi
lename=full.pdf)). 
 334. Downplaying the multitude of individual physical and mental abuses catalogued in the 
complaint, Justice Kennedy noted only that, as ―one of the detainees,‖ Iqbal was arrested on 
immigration charges, designated a person ―of high interest‖ to the September 11th investigations, 
held at the ADMAX SHU where he was ―kept in lockdown 23 hours a day,‖ sentenced to a prison 
term after pleading guilty to the criminal charges, and removed to Pakistan.  Id.  The Court‘s 
introductory remarks reduced the constitutional violations alleged in Iqbal‘s twenty-one-cause-of-
action complaint to a single sentence:  
For instance, the complaint alleges that respondent‘s jailors ―kicked him in the 
stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across‖ his cell without 
justification; subjected him to serial strip and body-cavity searches when he posed no 
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intended from the start to paint a picture of a legitimate and reasonable 
executive response to an unprecedented affront to American values and way 
of life. 
Next, Justice Kennedy turned to procedural history, where he 
selectively emphasized sections of the lower courts‘ opinions suggesting 
that qualified immunity is of paramount importance in the post-September 
11th context.335  He noted, for instance, Second Circuit Judge Cabranes‘s 
―concern at the prospect of subjecting high-ranking Government officials—
entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity and charged with 
responding to ‗a national and international security emergency 
unprecedented in the history of the American Republic‘—to the burdens of 
discovery.‖336  Echoing Judge Cabranes‘s dramatic language with respect 
to this issue, Justice Kennedy declined to utilize the same rhetorical 
flourishes in describing Iqbal‘s egregious conditions of confinement in the 
ADMAX SHU. 337  Acknowledging the wantonness of these allegations 
would have made it more difficult for the Court to explain why it accorded 
favorable treatment to policymaking Executive Branch officials by reducing 
their accountability through the judicial process.   
The Court further bolstered its underlying norms about the behavior of 
such officials in the opinion‘s legal analysis.  For instance, Justice Kennedy 
identified Iqbal‘s allegation that Ashcroft was the ―principal  architect‖ of 
the allegedly discriminatory policy as a ―bare assertion[]‖ not entitled to the 
presumption of truth accorded to facts.338  He also identified, as a ―more 
likely explanation[]‖ and ―obvious alternative‖ to Iqbal‘s theory that 
animus-based discrimination drove the post-September 11th detention 
policy, that Ashcroft‘s actions reflected legitimate security measures 
necessary to deal with an unprecedented homeland attack.339  That Justice 
Souter came to the opposite conclusion indicates the degree to which the 
Court‘s ―experience and common sense‖ slid imperceptively into a certain 
 
safety risk to himself or others; and refused to let him and other Muslims pray because 
there would be ―[n]o prayers for terrorists.‖ 
Id. at 1943–44 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).  
 335. Id. at 1944–45 (suggesting that the Court granted certiorari to resolve ―‗at the earliest 
opportunity‘‖ how to immunize officials at the motion to dismiss stage).   
 336. Id. at 1945 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 337. Id. at 1944.  Given Justice Kennedy‘s concern with separating facts from legal 
conclusions in assessing the plausibility of a complaint, his emphasis on dubiously factual post-
September 11th events is stark.  Ignoring the equivocality of history, Justice Kennedy artfully 
spun his own version of the facts relevant to Iqbal‘s case—external facts—in such a way as to 
mask his own selectivity in announcing them.  See id. at 1949–50 (explaining that Rule 8 ―does 
not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions‖). 
 338. Id. at 1951.  
 339. Id. at 1951–52. 
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strain of political ideology.340  The inherent subjectivity involved in high-
stakes decisionmaking by the Supreme Court coupled with that Court‘s 
discomfiting mandate of ad hoc adjudication in the lower courts reveals a 
shift away from Marbury v. Madison‘s premise that judicial review means 
saying what the law is,341 rather than what it should be, and back toward 
the bygone eras of the Codes342 and Lochner.343  
In rejecting the ―careful-case-management approach‖344  that would 
allow district judges to deal with potential infringement on a high-level 
official‘s governmental duties by letting a case proceed beyond the 12(b)(6) 
stage but prudently overseeing discovery, Justice Kennedy stated that the 
Court would not ―relax‖ the pleading requirements of Twombly and Rule 8, 
in part owing to the fact that such an approach would ―provide[] especially 
cold comfort in this pleading context.‖ 345   Because the discovery in 
question would likely require Ashcroft and Mueller to reveal information 
about post-September 11th government action better left unexposed, the 
Court‘s ability to determine that Iqbal‘s complaint was deficient provided a 
more blunt and predictable tool against such a consequence than an ad hoc 
judicial management approach could.346  In fact, the Court‘s approach had 
the effect of absolutely immunizing certain officials through the 
promulgation of a pleading standard that Iqbal could only overcome by 
alleging specific information regarding petitioners‘ intent, a virtual 
impossibility.347  It also retreated from the Court‘s position in Leatherman 
 
 340. Id. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 341. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (―It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.‖).  
 342. CLARK, supra note 65 (giving a history of the Field Codes and outlining problems 
associated with them).  
 343. Many consider Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), as symbolic of the height of 
judicial activism in the Court.  Some scholars offer a different view, however.  See, e.g., Cass 
Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873–75 (1987) (calling Lochner ―the most 
important of all defining cases‖ in constitutional law, but arguing that its lesson ―has yet to be 
settled‖ and that the decision should actually be read to symbolize ―an approach that imposes a 
constitutional requirement of neutrality, and understands the term to refer to preservation of the 
existing distribution of wealth and entitlements under the baseline of the common law‖ such that it 
has not, in fact, been overruled). 
 344. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (majority opinion). 
 345. Id. at 1953–54 (emphasis added). 
 346. Cf. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595–96 (1998) (noting that the D.C. Circuit had 
adopted a heightened proof standard largely to decrease discovery in actions against government 
officials that require proof of motive and concluding that ―the Court of Appeals‘ indirect effort to 
regulate discovery employs a blunt instrument that carries a high cost, for its rule also imposes a 
heightened standard of proof at trial upon plaintiffs with bona fide constitutional claims‖ (citing 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252–55 (1986))). 
 347. See McMahon, supra note 271, at 867 (suggesting that district judges look to Rule 8(e) 
when assessing plausibility in such circumstances).  Rule 8(e) provides that ―[a]ll pleadings shall 
be so construed as to do substantial justice.‖  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e). 
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v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit348 that a 
relaxed pleading standard subjecting government officials to costly and 
time-consuming discovery would confuse freedom from liability with 
immunity from suit.349   
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has ―dramatically‖ 
expanded the scope of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.350  Iqbal has 
now provided federal courts with a ―weapon‖ to continue doing so—the 
dubious panacea of plausibility.351  Whether lower courts will utilize Iqbal 
in this way remains to be seen.352  Ultimately, the more interesting question 
is what the implications of such an open-ended, flexible pleading standard 
will be not only for the difficult political cases like Iqbal, but for all civil 
actions.353  
Whether the Court‘s reason for implementing a plausibility standard 
was to save businesses from exposure to exorbitant discovery costs by 
creating a weeding-out mechanism for ―implausible‖ suits as early in the 
litigation as possible,354 to prevent years of litigation in the lower courts 
over the meaning of Twombly or otherwise, 355  or to continue along a 
conservative line fundamentally concerned with protecting government,356 
 
 348. 507 U.S. 163 (1993). 
 349. Id. at 166. 
 350. Weinstein, Role of Judges, supra note 315, at 103–04 (suggesting that the Roberts Court 
has played a role in this broadening scope and arguing that the expansion is problematic because it 
allows government actors to behave unjustly while still enjoying the impenetrable shield of 
immunity).   
 351. This weapon is likely to be even more effective when coupled with other Roberts Court 
tools for expanding immunity, such as through a judge-centered interpretation and application of 
―reasonableness‖—a term that is, like ―plausibility,‖ inherently malleable.  See, e.g., Scott v. 
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 393 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for ―basing its 
conclusions on its own factual assumptions‖ in applying the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
standard in a seizure case that turned on whether an officer who had run a citizen off the road in a 
high speed chase, rendering the latter a quadriplegic, had used unreasonable force). 
 352. Cf. Dodson, supra note 297, at 142 (suggesting that it will take years of increased 
litigation to determine what Twombly actually means). 
 353. It has long been accepted that procedural law has substantive implications.  For an 
argument that the converse is also true—that is, that substantive law is informed by procedural 
expectations—see Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 801 (2010). 
 354. Tony Mauro, Roberts Court Takes a Pro-Business Stance, N.Y. L.J., July 5, 2007, at 5. 
 355. McMahon, supra note 271, at 868 (pointing out that, ironically, although the Supreme 
Court may have intended to decrease the caseload of the district courts by lowering the standard 
for motions to dismiss, the new pleading standard will actually have the effect of delaying the 
final disposition of many cases while judges consider a greater number of motions to dismiss than 
ever before). 
 356. See generally Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy: The Supreme Court’s Stealth 
Hard-Liner, NEW YORKER, May 29, 2009, at 44.  Toobin suggests that ―[a]s a lawyer and now as 
Chief Justice, Roberts has always supported legal doctrines that serve a gatekeeping function,‖ 
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what is clear is that Iqbal‘s impact has been significant.  Only two months 
after the Court announced the decision, Senator Arlen Specter introduced a 
bill entitled Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009. 357   As its title 
suggests, the bill seeks to restore notice pleading by preventing federal 
courts from dismissing complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) ―except under the 
standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. 
Gibson.‖358  Senator Specter‘s proposal echoes Judge Clark‘s belief that 
just as history proved with the failure of the common-law and Code 
pleading eras, ―people will not tolerate the denial of justice for formalities 
only.‖359  It also responds to the possibility that the Court‘s plausibility 
standard may be on shaky constitutional grounds.360 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court extended the plausibility 
pleading standard announced in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly361 to all 
civil actions and dismissed under that standard respondent Iqbal‘s claims 
against two executive-level government supervisors asserting a qualified 
 
such as qualified immunity.  Id. at 49.  He also quotes then-Senator Obama as having said of the 
Chief Justice, ―It is my personal estimation that he has far more often used his formidable skills 
on behalf of the strong in opposition to the weak.‖  Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 357. S. 1504, 111th Cong. (as introduced by Senate, July 22, 2009).  The House of 
Representatives introduced a similar bill, the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, soon after the 
Senate.  H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (as introduced by House, Nov. 19, 2009) (seeking to amend 28 
U.S.C. § 2078 to provide, in relevant part, that a ―court shall not dismiss a complaint under sub-
division (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would 
entitle the plaintiff to relief‖ and that a ―court shall not dismiss a complaint under one of those 
subdivisions on the basis of a determination by the judge that the factual contents of the complaint 
do not show the plaintiff‘s claim to be plausible or are insufficient to warrant a reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged‖).  
 358. S. 1504. 
 359. Clark, supra note 77, at 458.  
 360. Cf. Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 1851, 1882 (2008) (arguing that Twombly and Tellabs have strayed from the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases by permitting courts to consider and weigh 
―plausible inferences‖ from both parties‘ pleadings, which were questions for the jury, not the 
judge, at common law).  Professor Thomas argues that, consciously or not, the Court has started to 
create new Seventh Amendment jurisprudence devoid of common-law analysis and therefore in 
violation of constitutional limits on courts‘ and Congress‘s authority over juries.  Id. at 1867–68.  
The Court‘s decision in Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. United States, 187 U.S. 315 
(1902), she suggests, is the closest that the Court has come to addressing the constitutionality of a 
motion to dismiss as a general matter.  She asserts that Fidelity supports the constitutionality of 
the Conley standard, but not the new plausibility standard.  Thomas, supra, at 1871–72 & n.114; 
see also McMahon, supra note 271, at 865 (―If Twombly indeed instructs district court judges to 
assess at the pleading stage whether facts pleaded in a complaint give rise to a ‗believable‘ (or 
‗credible‘) claim, we are inching perilously close to the line drawn by the Seventh 
Amendment . . . .‖).   
 361. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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immunity defense. 362   Reasoning that supervisory liability in Bivens 
cases363 are limited to purposeful constitutional violations by government 
officials, the Court held that the facts alleged in Iqbal‘s complaint did not 
support a plausible inference that petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller were 
personally liable for his grievances.364  In so holding, the Court took a 
piecemeal approach to the complaint, dividing factual assertions from legal 
conclusions in such a way as to highlight the degree to which a flexible 
―plausibility‖ standard based on the reviewing court‘s experience and 
common sense lends itself to judicial subjectivity.365  The Court therefore 
endorsed and encouraged judicial discretion in the lower courts, which will 
likely spawn a non-uniform, arbitrary pleading regime in which certain 
defendants will no longer gain meaningful access to the courts.366  This is 
because in devising and applying a procedural remedy to resolve the case, 
thereby retreating from longstanding deference to the formal rulemaking 
process as well as from the vision of the drafters of Rule 8, the Court 
essentially raised the pleading bar in an act of judicial rule revision 
unprecedented in the context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.367  
This aggressive act, justified by an asserted need to shield government 
officials from the burdens of discovery, reflects the Court‘s 
unacknowledged reliance on the post-September 11th context in effectively 
immunizing the two high-level officials without consideration of the merits 
of qualified immunity in relation to Iqbal‘s claims. 368   The decision 
therefore represents a procedural solution to a substantive dilemma.369   
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